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Black-box medicine—the use of big data and sophisticated machine-
learning techniques for health-care applications—could be the future
of personalized medicine. Black-box medicine promises to make it eas-
ier to diagnose rare diseases and conditions, identify the most promis-
ing treatments, and allocate scarce resources among different patients.
But to succeed, it must overcome two separate, but related, problems:
patient privacy and algorithmic accountability. Privacy is a problem
because researchers need access to huge amounts of patient health in-
formation to generate useful medical predictions. And accountability is
a problem because black-box algorithms must be verified by outsiders
to ensure they are accurate and unbiased, but this means giving outsid-
ers access to this health information.
This article examines the tension between the twin goals of privacy and
accountability and develops a framework for balancing that tension. It
proposes three pillars for an effective system of privacy-preserving ac-
countability: substantive limitations on the collection, use, and disclo-
sure of patient information; independent gatekeepers regulating
information sharing between those developing and verifying black-box
algorithms; and information-security requirements to prevent uninten-
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tional disclosures of patient information. The article examines and
draws on a similar debate in the field of clinical trials, where disclos-
ing information from past trials can lead to new treatments but also
threatens patient privacy.
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INTRODUCTION
Medicine is an unpredictable science. A treatment that provides a mirac-
ulous recovery for one patient may do nothing for the next. A new chemo-
therapy drug may extend patient lives by two years on average, but that
average consists of some patients who live many years longer and some
patients whose lives are not extended at all, or even are shortened. And with
new drugs costing more and more money, personalizing medicine is increas-
ingly important, so that doctors can predict disease risk and choose treat-
ments tailored to individual patients.
Medicine’s unpredictability has a simple cause. The human body is one
of the most complex systems in existence, with endless genetic variations,
biological pathways, protein expression patterns, metabolite concentrations,
and exercise patterns (to name just a few of the dozens of variables) affect-
ing each person differently. And only a few of these variables are well-
understood by scientists. When a drug doesn’t work or a patient develops a
rare disease, the reason could be some genetic variation or metabolite con-
centration or environmental difference—or several of these variables acting
together in ways doctors will likely never understand.
Black-box medicine—the use of big data and sophisticated machine-
learning techniques in opaque medical applications—could be the answer.1
1. See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419
(2015) (defining black-box medicine); Ruben Amarasingham et al., Implementing Electronic
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A scientist alone is unlikely to discover the precise combination of variables
that makes a drug work or not. But with enough data, a machine-learning
algorithm would have no trouble finding a predictive correlation. Using
datasets of genetic and health information, then, researchers can uncover
previously unknown connections between patient characteristics, symptoms,
and medical conditions. And these connections promise to yield new diag-
nostic tests and treatments and to enable individually tailored medical
decisions.
Big-data techniques are only as powerful as the input data and the meth-
ods used to analyze that data. Health care is especially ripe for a big-data
revolution, though, because of the sheer quantity of data available: research-
ers can obtain an endless variety of data points from literally millions of
patients. And because assembling and analyzing such large-scale datasets is
becoming easier and cheaper by the hour, many different researchers, from
both industry and the academy, are using data for everything from guiding
choices between different drugs to best allocating scarce hospital resources
among different patients.2
The sheer scale and scope of health data available to researchers, and the
sensitivity of that data, lead to two related but opposing problems. The first
problem is algorithmic accountability. Biological systems are so complex,
and big-data techniques are so opaque, that it can be difficult or impossible
to know if an algorithmic conclusion is incomplete, inaccurate, or biased.
And these problems can arise due to data limitations, analytical limitations,
or even intentional interference. Researchers or government agencies can
sometimes validate an algorithm’s conclusions, but doing so can be expen-
sive and difficult, and can require access to the same extensive medical data
from which the conclusions were drawn.
The second problem is privacy. Medical information can be some of the
most private information that exists, and black-box medicine requires access
to a lot of that information. It also creates new information, like predictions
based on the models developed with big data. And this information may be
used in ways that harms individuals, whether through marketing, sales to
others, or discrimination in employment, insurance, or other decisions. Even
Health Care Predictive Analytics: Considerations And Challenges, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1148
(2014) (describing big-data predictions in health); Xiaoqian Jiang et al., Calibrating Predictive
Model Estimates to Support Personalized Medicine, 19 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASSOC. 263
(2012) (discussing predictive analytics and personalized medicine); Joseph A. Cruz & David
S. Wishart, Applications of Machine Learning in Cancer Prediction and Prognosis, 2 CANCER
INFORMATICS 59 (2007) (describing machine-learning approaches to cancer prediction). Janine
S. Hiller, Healthy Predictions? Questions for Data Analytics in Health Care, 53 AM. BUS. L.J.
251 (2016).
2. See VIKTOR MAYER-SCH ¨ONBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION
THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK (2013) (describing many examples
of how large-scale datasets are making differences in day-to-day life).
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when it is not used in these ways, its collection, disclosure, and use can
infringe individual autonomy and decisional privacy.
These two problems presented by black-box medicine are interrelated
because efforts to reduce one will usually make the other worse. The solu-
tion to the accountability problem is to validate black-box models, but that
requires access to more information, which can exacerbate the privacy prob-
lem. And the solution to the privacy problem is to limit the amount of infor-
mation researchers, companies, and the government can use and to which
they have access, but that can make it harder to validate models and easier to
hide or overlook algorithmic problems. Algorithms need to be validated to
ensure high-quality medicine, but at the same time, a data free-for-all would
eviscerate patient privacy.
Solutions to the accountability and privacy problems, then, must con-
sider the broader effects on black-box medicine. There are three pillars to an
effective verification system that respects patient privacy. The first pillar is a
system of limitations on the collection, use, and dissemination of medical
data, so that data gathered and used to develop and verify black-box algo-
rithms is not also used for illegitimate purposes. The second pillar is a sys-
tem of independent gatekeepers to govern access to, and transmission of,
patient data, so that government and independent researchers can verify big-
data models. And the third pillar is robust information-security provisions,
so that unintended outsiders cannot obtain, use, or disseminate patient data.
The design of these verification systems can draw on the ongoing debate
over the disclosure of clinical-trial data, which has addressed related issues
of how to promote data sharing without sacrificing patient privacy. These
verification systems are critical if black-box medicine is to live up to its
promise without sacrificing patient privacy.
This article is structured in four parts. Part I provides background,
describing the promise and genesis of black-box medicine. Parts II and III
describe the two fundamental problems, with Part II discussing the challenge
of algorithmic accountability and Part III discussing the challenge of protect-
ing patient privacy. Part IV provides a structure to reconcile privacy and
accountability.
I. BLACK-BOX MEDICINE
Health care teems with complex problems. How should we treat a new
cancer?3 Which patients are most likely to benefit from organ transplants?4
3. See Janet E. Dancey et al., The Genetic Basis for Cancer Treatment Decisions, 148
CELL 409 (2012).
4. See Neil Mehta et al., Identification of Liver Transplant Candidates with Hepatocel-
lular Carcinoma and a Very Low Dropout Risk: Implications for the Current Organ Allocation
Policy, 19 LIVER TRANSPLANTATION 1343 (2013); Mark J. Russo et al., Local Allocation of
Lung Donors Results in Transplanting Lungs in Lower Priority Transplant Recipients, 95
ANN. THORACIC SURGERY 1231 (2013).
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How should hospital systems use scarce resources to best promote patient
health without wasting money on ineffective treatments?5 Some answers can
be gleaned from basic scientific research, clinical trials, and real-world expe-
rience. But many more answers lie beyond the scope of these processes,
because they are too slow to provide answers, too expensive, or insuffi-
ciently nuanced.
Black-box medicine provides a shortcut, letting us discover and use an-
swers to complex problems without fully understanding those problems or
the answers themselves. This Part examines that shortcut. First, it describes
the promise of black-box medicine. Then it discusses two technological
trends—the growing volume of available health-care information and the
growing power of methods to analyze that information—that have made
black-box medicine possible.
A. The Promise of Black-Box Medicine
Black-box medicine can help solve complex medical problems by bring-
ing to bear the power of big data. By using machine-learning algorithms to
analyze massive amounts of individual medical data—medical big data—
researchers can discover connections between specific patient attributes and
specific symptoms, diseases, or treatments. The promise of black-box
medicine, then, is that medical decisions can become personalized, predict-
ing disease and tailoring diagnostics and treatment to individual patients.
Black-box techniques can answer several distinct kinds of medical ques-
tions. Some of these questions concern how to best allocate scarce health-
care resources. For instance, we know some factors that affect which pa-
tients are most likely to benefit from organ transplants, and those factors,
among others, are considered in maintaining organ-transplant priority lists.6
But there are many other factors that influence the likelihood of success, and
at least some of those factors are hidden in the reams of data about trans-
plant-patient outcomes. Finding these patterns could help better allocate
scarce organs to the patients most likely to benefit from them. Similarly,
patterns hidden in existing health-care data could identify patients who need
urgent care or who are most likely to develop some future disease, allowing
physicians to intervene quickly and avoid greater harm in the future.7
Other questions concern how best to treat a particular patient. Many
medical treatments affect different patients differently; the same treatment,
given to two patients suffering from the same disease, may cure one patient
5. See Ruben Amarasingham et al., Allocating Scarce Resources in Real-Time to Re-
duce Heart Failure Readmissions: A Prospective, Controlled Study, 22 BRIT. MED. J. QUALITY
& SAFETY 998 (2013).
6. Russo et al., supra note 4; Mehta et al., supra note 4.
7. See, e.g., Amarasingham et al., supra note 5; DANIEL GARTNER, OPTIMIZING HOSPI-
TAL-WIDE PATIENT SCHEDULING: EARLY CLASSIFICATION OF DIAGNOSIS-RELATED GROUPS
THROUGH MACHINE LEARNING (2015).
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but have no effect for the other.8 A black-box algorithm could guide treat-
ment decisions by predicting that one drug might work better than another
for a specific patient, or might have fewer side effects, or that the patient
would likely respond best to a particular dose on a particular schedule.9 Such
algorithms could eliminate the need for physicians to experiment with differ-
ent drugs, saving significant time and money.
A different set of questions concerns how to quickly and efficiently di-
agnose diseases and conditions. Many diseases are simple to diagnose.
Blood tests, for instance, can conclusively diagnose many viral illnesses;
hypertension can be easily diagnosed with a sphygmomanometer. But others
are more difficult. Some diseases and conditions simply don’t have reliable
tests; others so closely resemble each other, or include so many subtypes,
that it is hard to tell different diseases or conditions apart.10 And sometimes a
patient may have underlying risk factors that may develop into a problematic
condition.11 Black-box algorithms could help diagnose these uncertain dis-
eases and conditions. A black-box model might, for instance, identify the
specific genes that predict who will develop a disease or condition; or it
might tell physicians, earlier than they could otherwise tell, which of two
similar diseases a patient has.12
Some of these benefits can be obtained through other means; others are
unique to black-box medicine. But even when other means are available,
black-box algorithms could significantly reduce health-care costs by elimi-
nating the need to perform other, costly tests or to waste time on ineffective
8. See Margaret A. Hamburg & Francis S. Collins, The Path to Personalized Medicine,
363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 301 (2010) (describing personalized medicine).
9. See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Personalized Medicine, http://www.fda.gov/
scienceresearch/specialtopics/personalizedmedicine/default.htm (describing the goal of provid-
ing “the right patient with the right drug at the right dose at the right time.”).
10. See, e.g., Konstantina Kourou et al., Machine learning applications in cancer prog-
nosis and prediction, 13 COMPUTATIONAL & STRUCTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY J. 8 (2015) (re-
viewing the application of machine-learning techniques to the problem of classifying different
types of cancer); Steven I. Sherman et al., Augmenting pre-operative risk of recurrence strati-
fication in differentiated thyroid carcinoma using machine learning and high dimensional
transcriptional data from thyroid FNA, 33 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 6044 (2015) (reporting a
study using machine learning to classify thyroid cancer tumors); Vivek Subbiah & Razelle
Kurzrock, Universal Genomic Testing Needed to Win the War Against Cancer: Genomics IS
the Diagnosis, 2 JAMA ONCOLOGY 719 (2016).
11. See Yiran Guo et al., Machine learning derived risk prediction of anorexia nervosa,
9 BMC MED. GENOMICS, no. 4, 2016, at 1 (reporting on an effort to use machine-learning
techniques to assess patients’ risk of developing the eating disorder anorexia nervosa based on
genetic data).
12. See e.g., Graziella Orru` et al., Using Support Vector Machine to Identify Imaging
Biomarkers of Neurological and Psychiatric Disease: A Critical Review, 36 NEUROSCIENCE &
BIOBEHAVIORAL REV. 1140 (2012); Elaheh Moradi et al., Machine Learning Framework for
Early MRI-Based Alzheimer’s Conversion Prediction in MCI Subjects, 104 NEUROIMAGE 398
(2015); Zhi Wei et al., Large Sample Size, Wide Variant Spectrum, and Advanced Machine-
Learning Technique Boost Risk Prediction for Inflammatory Bowel Disease, 92 AM. J. HUM.
GENETICS 1008 (2013).
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treatments. And they could lead to better health outcomes as inappropriate
treatments or dangerous side effects are avoided.
To be sure, there is no guarantee that black-box medicine will live up to
its promise; significant challenges will have to be overcome if black-box
algorithms are to become a routine and accepted part of health care for most
patients. Our goal in this article is not to argue that black-box medicine will
be a cure-all, or even a solution to rising health-care costs. Instead, we ob-
serve that the trend of researchers making use of patient health information,
including in black-box algorithms, is only likely to accelerate. And that ac-
celeration will create several challenges for policy makers, including the
challenge of protecting patient privacy while promoting algorithmic
verification.
B. The Genesis of Black-Box Medicine
Black-box medicine is becoming possible because of two related tech-
nological trends. One is that the health-care system generates ever-larger
amounts of health data about individual patients. The other is that new ana-
lytic tools like machine learning make it possible to analyze those vast
troves of health data to find underlying patterns. These tools don’t reveal the
causes of those patterns; they simply reveal predictions or recommendations
on which doctors can rely. A doctor might know, then, that a particular treat-
ment is the best option for a patient with certain genetic markers without
knowing how or why those markers matter. This is the black box of black-
box medicine: decisions can be based on opaque algorithmic analysis of doz-
ens or hundreds of variables, with no theories to explain the results.13
Big data in health. The first trend is the increasing amounts of health
data available to researchers. Black-box medicine would not be possible
without this mass of health data, which is rapidly growing both because
routinely collected data is more broadly available and because new forms of
measurement create data that didn’t previously exist.14
Data that have long been collected are newly accessible for several rea-
sons. Routine clinical visits are now recorded in electronic health records
13. Price, supra note 1, at 433–34. Not all machine-learning algorithms are fully black-
box; some are truly opaque, others yield patterns so complex as to be largely uninterpretable,
and some methods may in fact be interpreted. Id. And some may move from being opaque to
being interpreted as reverse-engineering techniques advance. We focus here on the first two
categories, both of which may be described as “black box.” Greater privacy protections may be
needed when using interpretable algorithms, since an output from an algorithm may reveal
inputs and further compromise privacy. See infra note 101 (discussing a study reverse engi-
neering an algorithm for predicting optimal Warfarin dosages).
14. See David W. Bates et al., Big Data in Health Care: Using Analytics to Identify and
Manage High-Risk and High-Cost Patients, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1123 (2014).
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rather than being relegated to paper files in doctors’ offices.15 Pharmacy
records are now consolidated in electronic databases of prescription and ful-
fillment information.16 Insurance claims are amassed in administrative
claims databases that record episodes of care.17 When all of these records
were kept in paper, any effort to use them to develop or verify black-box
algorithms would be prohibitively expensive or logistically overwhelming.
Now that they are electronic, though, new forms of analysis become
possible.18
New technologies are also generating new types of health data. Genetic
sequencing may be the most important of these new technologies, because it
reveals a vast number of inherited differences between individuals.19 While
genetic sequencing was, until recently, prohibitively expensive, it has rap-
idly dropped in price, reaching $1,245 per patient in October 2015.20 As a
result, hundreds of thousands of patients have had their entire genomes se-
quenced;21 many more have been tested for specific genetic variations22 or
15. See Julia Adler-Milstein et al., Electronic Health Record Adoption In US Hospitals:
Progress Continues, But Challenges Persist, 34 HEALTH AFF. 2174, 2176 (2016) (finding that
75.2% of hospitals had adopted at least basic electronic health-records systems by 2014).
16. See Joy M. Grossman et al., Transmitting and Processing Electronic Prescriptions:
Experiences of Physician Practices and Pharmacies, 19 J. AM. MED. INFO. ASS’N 353, 353
(2012) (An “important e-prescribing feature is the two-way electronic exchange of prescription
data between physicians and pharmacies. Physicians can transmit new prescriptions directly
from their e-prescribing systems into pharmacy information systems as well as respond to
pharmacies’ electronic renewal authorization.”).
17. See, e.g., Colin R. Cooke & Theodore J. Iwashyna, Using existing data to address
important clinical questions in critical care, 21 CRIT. CARE MED. 886, 889 (2013) (describing
administrative claims data).
18. See Peter B. Jensen et al., Mining Electronic Health Records: Towards Better Re-
search Applications and Clinical Care, 13 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 395, 395 (2012)
(“Databases in modern health centres automatically capture structured data relating to all as-
pects of care, including diagnosis, medication, laboratory test results and radiological imaging
data. This transformation holds great promise for the individual patient as richer information,
coupled with clinical decision support (CDS) systems, becomes readily available at the bed-
side to support informed decision making and to improve patient safety.”).
19. See Wylie Burke & Bruce M. Psaty, Personalized Medicine in the Era of Genomics,
298 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 1682 (2007) (“Enthusiastic predictions about personalized medicine
have surrounded the sequencing of the human genome . . . . [G]enomics-based knowledge and
tools promise the ability to approach each patient as the biological individual he or she is, 
thereby radically changing our paradigms and improving efficacy.”).
20. See The Cost of Sequencing a Human Genome, NATIONAL HUMAN GENOME RE-
SEARCH INSTITUTE, https://www.genome.gov/27565109/the-cost-of-sequencing-a-human-
genome/ (last updated Jan. 15, 2016).
21. See Antonio Regalado, EmTech: Illumina Says 228,000 Human Genomes Will Be 
Sequenced in 2014, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (Sept. 24, 2014), https://www.technology 
review.com/s/531091/emtech-illumina-says-228000-human-genomes-will-be-sequenced-this-
year/.
22. See Matthew B. Yurgelun et al., Population-Wide Screening for Germline BRCA1 
and BRCA2 Mutations: Too Much of a Good Thing?, 33 J. CLIN. ONCOLOGY 3092 (2015)
(describing genetic tests indicating predispositions toward breast or ovarian cancer).
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have parts of their genomes sequenced.23 Beyond genetic sequencing, other
new technologies also generate new forms of health data, including measure-
ments of gene expression24 and screens for the presence and levels of various
metabolites in the body.25 And some of these tools are increasingly available
directly to consumers, like 23andMe’s gene-testing services.26 New health
data also comes from more prosaic sources. Personal activity trackers like
those sold by Fitbit and Apple, for instance, record individuals’ activity,
providing new data that could be used in black-box medicine. Similarly,
shopping patterns can predict health outcomes.27
When all of these categories of health data of different types are com-
bined, from different sources, covering tens or hundreds of millions of pa-
tients, the result is enough data to reveal even subtle trends in health
information. To be sure, there are substantial technological, economic, and
legal hurdles in bringing together data from different sources into coherent
records while ensuring data quality.28 And even a carefully assembled
dataset can imperfectly represent the patient population, since it may draw
from a homogeneous or underinclusive population, or can reflect existing
bias by physicians and other providers in diagnoses, prescriptions, tests or-
23. See Kiera Peikoff, Fearing Punishment for Bad Genes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/08/science/fearing-punishment-for-bad-genes.html
(reporting, in 2014, that 700,000 Americans had their DNA sequenced, in whole or in part).
24. See, e.g., Laura J. van ‘t Veer et al., Gene Expression Profiling Predicts Clinical 
Outcome of Breast Cancer, 415 NATURE 530, 530 (2002) (“Here we used DNA microarray 
analysis on primary breast tumours of 117 young patients, and applied supervised classifica-
tion to identify a gene expression signature strongly predictive of a short interval to distant 
metastases in patients without tumour cells in local lymph nodes at diagnosis.”); Christina D. 
Lyngholm et al., Validation of a Gene Expression Profile Predictive of the Risk of Radiation-
Induced Fibrosis in Women Treated with Breast Conserving Therapy, 54 ACTA ONCOLOGICA 
1665, 1665 (2015) (“[W]e examined the frequency and degree of late morbidity related to 
[breast cancer treatment] and demonstrated moderate to severe fibrosis (grade ii–iii) in the 
residual breast in 23% of the patients 7–20 years after treatment.”).
25. See Omran Abu Aboud & Robert H. Weiss, New Opportunities from the Cancer 
Metabolome, 59 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 138 (2013) (describing the use of metabolite screens in 
cancer treatment).
26. Using 450,000 customers’ genetic information, 23andMe was able to pinpoint 15 
genetic locations associated with clinical depression. See Craig L. Hyde et al., Identification of 
15 genetic loci associated with risk of major depression in individuals of European descent, 48 
NATURE GENET. 1031 (2016); Antonio Regalado, 23andMe Pulls Off Massive Crowdsourced 
Depression Study, MIT TECH. REV., https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602052/23andme-
pulls-off-massive-crowdsourced-depression-study/ (Aug. 1, 2016).
27. See Rebecca Robins, Insurers Want to Nudge You to Better Health. So They’re Data 
Mining Your Shopping Lists, STAT NEWS (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.statnews.com/2015/ 
12/15/insurance-big-data/ (“Shopping at home-improvement stores, for instance, turns out to 
be a great predictor of mental health. If you suddenly stop shopping at Lowe’s, your insurance 
company may suspect that you’re depressed.”).
28. See Price, supra note 13 (describing the challenges of gathering, cleaning, and link-
ing data for black-box medicine).
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dered, or notes taken.29 But these hurdles are at least partially addressable
and larger and more comprehensive health datasets are becoming available,
if slowly, for analysis and innovation. For instance, as part of President
Obama’s Precision Medicine Initiative, the NIH is assembling a comprehen-
sive dataset, including health records, questionnaire data, and genetic infor-
mation, on a million volunteers; that uniform and comprehensive dataset will
be a useful tool for developing better black-box algorithms.30 Similarly, the
Million Veteran Program aims to collect blood samples and health records
from one million veterans for use in health research.31
New analytical tools. The second trend is the development of new tools
for analyzing large datasets to find patterns. Raw data are not particularly
useful for making health-care decisions; instead, the patterns and relation-
ships that are embedded in data can provide information that drives deci-
sions. So the critical question is how to find these underlying patterns, and
the answer lies in learning algorithms being developed in the field of ma-
chine learning and artificial intelligence.32 These algorithms are already be-
ing used in numerous contexts, medical and otherwise. For instance,
Google’s Image Search and Facebook’s DeepFace facial-recognition al-
gorithm both use black-box image-recognition algorithms to determine the
content of images and identify faces.33 Similar algorithms can find clusters
of factors that predict the risk of developing a disease or benefiting from a
specific drug.34 These machine-learning algorithms come in many forms, in-
cluding one technology, deep-learning neural networks, that is literally
modeled on the human brain.35
29. See, e.g., Sarah E. Malanga et al., Big Data Neglects Populations Most in Need of 
Medical and Public Health Research and Interventions (draft on file with authors); Jonas 
Lerman, Big Data and Its Exclusions, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 55 (2013); Solon Barocas & 
Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671 (2016); Pauline T. 
Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2017); see 
also infra note 102 and accompanying text.
30. See Precision Medicine Initiative Cohort Program – FAQ, NAT’L INSTITUTES OF 
HEALTH (July 6, 2016), https://www.nih.gov/precision-medicine-initiative-cohort-program/ 
precision-medicine-initiative-cohort-program-frequently-asked-questions.
31. See  Million  Veteran  Program,  U.S. DEPT. OF VETERANS AFF., http://www. 
research.va.gov/mvp/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2016).
32. For an overview of machine-learning techniques, see PETER FLACH, MACHINE 
LEARNING: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF ALGORITHMS THAT MAKE SENSE OF DATA (2012).
33. See Yaniv Taigman et. al, DeepFace: Closing the Gap to Human-Level Perform-
ance in Face Verification, RESEARCH AT FACEBOOK (June 24, 2014), https://research.face- 
book.com/publications/deepface-closing-the-gap-to-human-level-performance-in-face-verificat 
ion/.
34. See President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology: Priorities for Per-
sonalized Medicine, WHITEHOUSE.GOV 13, 55 (September 2008), https://www.whitehouse. 
gov/files/documents/ostp/PCAST/pcast_report_v2.pdf (providing examples of applications 
of algorithms in the personalized medicine context).
35. Neural Network, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (online) (last visited Nov. 6, 2016).
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While the details of different machine-learning algorithms are not im-
portant for this article, one common difficulty is: machine-learning algo-
rithms are typically opaque, meaning the patterns found and used are not
transparent to the user. Facebook’s DeepFace, for instance, uses a neural
network trained on four million images to analyze faces; while the network
can tell whether two faces are the same with 97.35% accuracy, it cannot tell
us why two faces are the same, or state with any intelligibility what features
are used in that classification.36 Such an opaque algorithm can provide an-
swers, but can’t explain those answers or provide any generalizable theories.
Opacity comes in different forms; an algorithm can be deliberately or
inherently opaque. With a deliberately opaque algorithm, the developer
chooses to keep secret specific details of the algorithm, such as the algorithm
itself or the way it was developed. These deliberately opaque algorithms are
increasingly common in everything from stock-market trading to credit rat-
ings to Internet search results.37
Machine-learning tools like those used in black-box medicine are differ-
ent. In many cases they generate algorithms that are unavoidably opaque.38
These algorithms typically cannot identify the reasons for the patterns they
find, due to the iterative processes by which the algorithms are developed.
Neural networks, like those used in DeepFace, are modeled on the human
brain, with artificial “synapses” that are followed or not, depending on the
success or failure of a test. The eventual result of training those processes
cannot be stated explicitly.39 And even when patterns discovered by an al-
gorithm can be stated, those patterns are typically far too complex to be of
much use in understanding underlying mechanisms. Knowing that a combi-
36. Taigman, supra note 33, at 1, 4 (describing dataset, noting accuracy, and describing
the six-layer neural network and connections between the layers).
37. FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CON-
TROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 4 (2015) (“Credit raters, search engines, major banks, and the
TSA take in data about us and convert it into scores, rankings, risk calculations, and watch lists
with vitally important consequences. But the proprietary algorithms by which they do so are
immune from scrutiny, except on the rare occasions when a whistleblower litigates or leaks.”)
38. To be sure, black-box medicine can also be deliberately opaque, as when developers
keep secret the way they develop algorithms, the data on which those algorithms are based, or
the ways those algorithms were validated. This secrecy presents potential challenges for ensur-
ing quality, as well as for the incentives and ability to develop new algorithms in the first
place. See W. Nicholson Price II, Patents, Big Data, and the Future of Medicine, 37 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1401 (2016) (discussing the incentive benefits and challenges of secrecy in the devel-
opment of black-box medicine) [hereinafter Price, Big Data].
39. See Tom Simonite, Facebook Creates Software that Matches Faces Almost as Well
as You Do, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar. 17, 2014) https://www.technologyreview.com/s/525586/
facebook-creates-software-that-matches-faces-almost-as-well-as-you-do/ (reporting that 
Facebook’s software “uses networks of simulated neurons to learn to recognize patterns in 
large amounts of data”); Taigman, supra note 33 (reporting that Facebook’s algorithm in-
volves more than 120 million parameters).
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nation of 5,000 specific gene alleles predicts drug response in a lung tumor,
for instance, tells us little about why that is.40
Although black-box techniques offer substantial potential to advance
health care, the accompanying opacity presents a different kind of challenge
from those faced by most medical technologies. It is much harder to be con-
fident that something works and is safe when we cannot understand how it
works or why it is safe. Physicians, patients, insurers, and regulators will be
skeptical, and some of this skepticism will be justified. Not all black-box
techniques will work, and not all that do work will work well. But some
will, and the potential benefits from those that do work are large. Maximiz-
ing these benefits requires confronting the accountability challenge: how can
we ensure that algorithms adopted in practice are high-quality and reliable?
II. THE ACCOUNTABILITY CHALLENGE
The first problem that arises from the growth of black-box medicine is
algorithmic accountability. Patients, health-care providers, and insurers must
be able to trust in the quality of black-box medicine before they will rely on
it. And this trust is fundamentally difficult to establish due to the inherent
opacity of black-box algorithms. Since no one knows—or can know—ex-
actly how black-box algorithms work, traditional means of showing medical
quality largely fail. Users can’t rely on scientific understanding of an al-
gorithm, as they frequently do with conventional treatments and diagnostic
methods, and clinical trials fit poorly with complex, opaque algorithms ex-
cept at the very broadest level. Black-box medicine, then, demands new
methods of verification, like computational verification performed by inde-
pendent third parties.
A. The Need for Verification
Verification is the process of proving that a medical device, treatment,
or diagnostic test works and performs its intended function.41 Black-box al-
gorithms need verification, just like other health-care goods, for three major
reasons. First, health-care goods are classic credence goods: consumers can’t
independently evaluate their quality and so must accept on faith that a treat-
40. See Hojin Moon et al., Ensemble Methods for Classification of Patients for Person-
alized Medicine with High-Dimensional Data, 41 ARTIF. INTELL. MED. 197, 203–04 (2007).
41. For diagnostic tests, verification is often divided into three parts: analytical validity 
(whether a test accurately measures what it purports to measure), clinical validity (whether 
what the test measures accurately reflects an underlying clinical characteristic), and clinical 
utility (whether the test can be used to usefully guide care). See Levels of Evidence for Cancer 
Genetics Studies, NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE, http://www.cancer.gov/publications/pdq/ 
levels-evidence/genetics (last updated July 25, 2012). The third is most important for black-box 
medicine, since the first two will often be unknown.
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ment or test works as intended.42 When someone is sick, takes a drug, and
gets better, maybe the drug worked—or maybe the patient would have got-
ten better just as quickly, or more quickly, without the drug. And since it is
usually difficult or impossible to determine in individual cases which possi-
bility is most likely, the field of medicine uses other methods, like random-
ized double-blind clinical trials, to determine efficacy.43
Second, verification is essential for black-box medicine (and other
health-care goods) because health-care markets are poorly suited to weeding
out low-quality products, even when reliable information is available.
Health-care markets are unusually complex, with no single, knowledgeable
consumer having an incentive to select high-quality products. Instead, doc-
tors typically select treatments, insurers pay for those treatments, and pa-
tients benefit from them.44 Patients want to get well and to minimize out-of-
pocket costs and inconvenience; doctors want to provide beneficial interven-
tions but face complex incentives regarding the volume and cost of care;45
and insurers want to decrease their own costs, while avoiding costlier later
illnesses—unless patients are likely to have switched insurers by then. Doc-
tors may also be susceptible to automation bias, trusting algorithms even
when they haven’t been proven reliable. These overlapping and conflicting
incentives, and the complexity of the existing mechanisms for selecting and
paying for care, mean that the health-care market cannot, on its own, easily
choose high-quality care.46
42. See, e.g., Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer, On Doctors, Mechanics, and Com-
puter Specialists: The Economics of Credence Goods, 44 J. ECON. LIT. 5, 5-6 (2006) (“Goods
and services where an expert knows more about the quality a consumer needs than the con-
sumer himself are called credence goods.”); W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Complex and
Black-Box Medical Algorithms (draft manuscript on file with authors) (“For patients espe-
cially, medical algorithms, like many other medical technologies, are ‘credence goods’ whose
efficacy must generally be taken on faith—or, more accurately, on the word of those with
more knowledge.”).
43. See Susan White Junod, FDA and Clinical Trials: A Short History, FDA, http://
www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Overviews/ucm304485.htm (last updated 
July 7, 2014). (“Although several kinds of randomized controlled trial methodologies can 
be useful to researchers and regulators, ultimately, it was the randomized, double-blinded,
placebo controlled experiment which became the standard by which most other experimental
methods were judged, and it has often subsequently been referred to as the ‘gold’ standard for
clinical trial methodology.”).
44. A rich literature addresses the varying incentives of different players in the health-
care system. See, e.g., HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS (Anthony Cuyler & Joseph New-
house eds., 2000); INCENTIVES AND CHOICE IN HEALTH CARE (Frank Sloan & Hirschel Kasper
eds., 1st ed. 2008).
45. In pure fee-for-service models, doctors face incentives to increase the volume and
cost of care; in newer models, those incentives may be tempered by limits on payment or
revenue-sharing schemes.
46. Cf. Saurabh Bhargava et al., Do Individuals Make Sensible Health Insurance Deci-
sions? Evidence from a Menu with Dominated Options (National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, Working Paper No. 21160, 2015), available at http://www.nber.org/ (finding that a
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Third, verification is essential for black-box medicine because of its in-
herent opacity, which makes algorithms harder to evaluate and more likely
to be of highly variable quality. Some black-box algorithms and products
will work well, some will work poorly, and some will not work at all, de-
pending on whether they rely on real underlying relationships that reflect
actual biology or spurious correlations that happen to arise in a particular
database or slice of a large database. And this variability is exacerbated by
barriers to entry that should fall significantly over time. At this time, devel-
oping black-box algorithms requires access to large amounts of patient infor-
mation that must be collected, at great expense, along with substantial
programming expertise and computational infrastructure.47 But eventually,
these costs will fall as data is combined into large datasets and computa-
tional tools become standardized. Indeed, developing lower-cost tools is
much of the point of black-box medicine. But with low entry barriers comes
the likelihood of low-quality products developed by low-quality developers.
These low-quality algorithms could be quite bad for patients. Some po-
tential errors would be relatively benign, as when an algorithm incorrectly
suggests diagnostic testing based on an elevated risk that was never actually
elevated. Unnecessary diagnostic tests are not cost-free, but are less likely to
cause serious harms.48 But other potential errors would be more harmful, as
when an algorithm recommends the wrong drug or the wrong dose of the
right drug.49 To be sure, such mistakes already happen in great numbers.50
But the promise of black-box medicine is to reduce them, not to perpetuate
or increase them. Black-box medicine could also reflect embedded bias or
discriminatory rules, whether introduced through biased datasets or through
majority of employees studied chose dominated health insurance plan options, resulting in
substantial excess spending).
47. See Price, supra note 1, at 449 (describing the costs of developing black-box
medicine).
48. See, e.g., Joann G. Elmore et al., Ten-Year Risk of False Positive Screening Mam-
mograms and Clinical Breast Examinations, 338 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1089 (1998) (finding that
over a 10-year period, each woman undergoing regular mammograms and clinical breast ex-
ams faced a cumulative 49.1% risk of a false positive diagnosis); David W. Dowdy et al., Is
Scale-Up Worth It? Challenges in Economic Analysis of Diagnostic Tests for Tuberculosis, 8
PLOS MED., 1–3 (2011) (estimating the false-positive costs of a scaled-up tuberculosis diag-
nostic test); Timothy J. Wilt & Philipp Dahm, PSA Screening for Prostate Cancer: Why Say-
ing No Is a High-Value Health Care Choice, 13 J. NAT’L COMPREHENSIVE CANCER NETWORK
1566 (2015) (arguing against prostate-specific-antigen screening for prostate cancer because it
results in little benefit and substantial cost).
49. See Kit Huckvale et al., Smartphone Apps for Calculating Insulin Dose: A System-
atic Assessment, 13 BMC MED. 106 (2015) (noting pervasive errors in smartphone apps used
to calculate the dosage of insulin for diabetics). Similarly, if an algorithm suggested the wrong
drug for a developing malignant tumor, the time lost to ineffective treatment could make the
cancer harder to treat eventually.
50. The literature on medical error is voluminous; perhaps the highest-profile summary
is INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T.
Kohn, Janet M. Corrigan, & Molla S. Donaldson eds., 2000).
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biases in algorithmic development.51 A robust verification system could help
avoid these errors and biases, which would otherwise be difficult for con-
sumers to avoid.
B. Verification by Clinical Trials
Though clinical trials are the most common means of verifying medical
devices, treatments, and diagnostic tests, they face substantial challenges in
the context of black-box medicine. Normally, the FDA uses clinical trials to
validate new medical treatments. And clinical trials could be usefully ap-
plied to some types of black-box medicine. For example, in a situation in
which a black-box algorithm recommends which of two cancer drugs a pa-
tient should take, a group of patients could be randomly separated; some
would have their treatment regime assigned according to the algorithm, and
others according to the standard of care. Improvements in results for the
algorithm-assigned patients would point to an algorithm that improves on
the standard of care.
There are limits, though, to how useful clinical trials can be in verifying
black-box algorithms. Clinical trials are expensive, slow, and blunt tools for
their ordinary role of ensuring new drugs are safe and effective; they’re even
worse when it comes to verifying fast-moving black-box algorithms.
Clinical trials for new drugs cost hundreds of millions, or billions, of dol-
lars.52 Although clinical trials to support approval of new medical devices—
including diagnostic tests—are far cheaper than those to support approval of
a new drug, they still cost $1 to $10 million or more.53 Clinical trials to
demonstrate a new use for an already-approved drug—a likely, and desira-
51. See supra note 28 and accompanying text; see also Kate Crawford, Artificial Intelli-
gence’s White Guy Problem, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/
26/opinion/sunday/artificial-intelligences-white-guy-problem.html (describing biases embed-
ded in artificial-intelligence algorithms).
52. Clinical trials for new drugs take an average of five years and are usually estimated 
to cost an average of several hundred million to almost three billion dollars, though the exact 
figures are hotly disputed. See, e.g., Joseph A. DiMasi et. al, The Price of Innovation: New 
Estimates of Drug Development Cost, 22 J. HEALTH ECON., 151 (2003) (estimating that the 
cost of obtaining FDA preapproval is $802 million over 5 years); Christopher P. Adams & Van
V. Brantner, Estimating The Cost Of New Drug Development: Is It Really $802 Million?, 25 
HEALTH AFF., 420 (2006) (estimating the cost of obtaining FDA preapproval to vary between
$500 million and $2 billion over 52 months); Yeveniy Feyman, Opinion: Shocking Secrets of
FDA  Clinical  Trials  Revealed,  FORBES  (Jan.  24, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/the-
apothecary/2014/01/24/shocking-secrets-of-fda-clinical-trials-revealed/           (updating 
DiMasi’s $802 million estimate in 2003 to $1.3 billion in 2009); but see Aylin Sertkaya et. al, 
Examination of Clinical Trial Costs and Barriers for Drug Development, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH 
&  HUMAN  SERVICES,  Table  1  (July  25, 2014), https://aspe.hhs.gov/report/examination-
clinical-trial-costs-and-barriers-drug-development (estimating that the cost of Phase I, II, and 
III clinical trials are approximately $20 to $70 million).
53. For an overview of the medical device approval pathway, see, Aaron V. Kaplan et 
al., Medical Device Development From Prototype to Regulatory Approval, 109 CIRCULATION 
3068 (2004).
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ble, outcome of black-box medicine—are substantially more expensive.54
These cost hurdles would sharply limit the potential of black-box medicine
to generate cheaper medical innovation based on already-existing data.
The slowness of clinical trials would also make it hard to harness the
ability of black-box medicine to quickly find new patterns in ever-expanding
datasets. Clinical trials typically take three to five years.55 Machine-learning
algorithms, though, can find useful relationships in weeks, days, or hours,
and can update their predictions in real-time as new data is added. Relying
on multi-year clinical trials to verify black-box algorithms would substan-
tially delay their usefulness; relying on a new clinical trial each time an
algorithm was updated would quickly prove unworkable.
Even if clinical trials were cheaper and quicker, they are poorly matched
to the problem of verifying black-box interventions that are truly precise or
personalized. A clinical trial works by assembling a cohort of comparable
patients, treating a randomized subset of that cohort with the intervention to
be tested, and observing whether that subset improves measurably. This
works for, say, a drug that is supposed to work for everyone with lung can-
cer, because one need only assemble a cohort of lung-cancer patients. And it
works, though with more effort, for drugs with more complex indications,
such as a drug designed to help diabetic children with lung cancer, since
those cohorts are harder, though not impossible, to assemble. But black-box
medicine can identify interventions that are tailored to single individuals, not
groups with similar indications. And without the ability to randomize across
a set of similar patients and observe different outcomes, there is no way to
conduct a clinical trial of an algorithm that predicts individual responses of
individual patients. One possibility is a meta-trial, in which members of a
cohort subset are treated according to the predictions of a black-box al-
gorithm (whatever the treatment for each individual) and members of a dif-
ferent subset are untreated, or treated according to a standard protocol, but
this is far from the typical trial designed to evaluate a particular intervention.
To be sure, randomized double-blind trials are second to none at demon-
strating that an intervention is safe and effective, and some physicians will
undoubtedly look skeptically at black-box algorithms that haven’t been sub-
jected to clinical trials. Other tools for verifying an algorithm, like the com-
putational-verification tools discussed next, are a close approximation. But
they will never be able to demonstrate causation in the same way that a
randomized double-blind clinical trial can. And clinical trials could still be
useful in some circumstances to verify black-box predictions or interven-
tions. For instance, black-box predictions of which prostate cancers are rap-
idly progressing and which are indolent could be used to guide care of a
random selection of men being screened. This would verify the strength of
54. See supra note 52.
55. See supra note 52.
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the prediction at low cost.56 But the practical obstacles to subjecting each
algorithm to a clinical trial would be enormous, and the likely benefits of
doing so would, in many cases, be small. Regulations should be cautious,
then, before requiring a clinical trial for each black-box algorithm.
Despite these difficulties, the FDA appears to be turning toward the
clinical-trial model to verify black-box algorithms. In October 2014, the
FDA issued a Draft Guidance for Industry on the regulation of laboratory-
developed tests, which are developed and used in individual laboratories in-
stead of packaged and sold more broadly.57 Under the FDA’s broad defini-
tion of medical devices, it would regulate many forms of black-box
medicine as laboratory-developed tests.58 And the Draft Guidance explained
that it considered to be higher risks “those devices that claim to enhance the
use of a specific therapeutic product, through selection of therapy, patient
population, or dose, but which are not included in the therapeutic product
labeling (e.g., devices developed by laboratories that claim to predict who
will respond to a therapy approved for use in a larger population).”59 Such
targeting diagnostics are the heart of black-box medicine. Their classifica-
tion as higher-risk means that they would need to be validated by clinical
trials before use, implicating the problems described above.
The FDA’s approach is not yet set in stone and may not end up applying
to all black-box medicine. And clinical trials could help demonstrate quality
in some black-box algorithms, especially as they go from development into
medical practice. They could also help persuade skeptical physicians, pa-
tients, and insurers that black-box algorithms are trustworthy. But requiring
clinical trials for every black-box algorithm would be a substantial obstacle
for algorithm developers. If the FDA maintains the broad, relatively inflexi-
ble approach suggested in the Draft Guidance, it risks significantly slowing
the development of high-quality black-box medicine.
56. See Shazia Irshad et al., A Molecular Signature Predictive of Indolent Prostate Can-
cer, 5 SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED. 202ra122 (2013) (“Gleason score prostate tumors can be
distinguished as indolent and aggressive subgroups on the basis of their expression of genes
associated with aging and senescence. Using gene set enrichment analysis, we identified a 19-
gene signature enriched in indolent prostate tumors.”).
57. FDA, DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF,
AND CLINICAL LABORATORIES: FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF LABORATORY 
DEVELOPED TESTS (LDTS), (October 3, 2014), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/ucm416685.pdf [here-
inafter LDT Draft Guidance].
58. A full discussion of FDA regulation of black-box medicine is complex, involving
FDA’s limitation on regulating the practice of medicine, the difference between laboratory-
developed tests and more broadly sold in vitro diagnostic kits, and the practical realities of
FDA’s informal power. Such a discussion is outside the scope of this work.
59. LDT Draft Guidance, supra note 57, at 27.
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C. Computational Verification
Computational verification is the principal alternative to clinical trials
for verifying the quality of black-box algorithms. While clinical trials are
poorly suited to validating black-box algorithms, computational verification
based on patient data can demonstrate the quality of black-box algorithms
while preserving their power, flexibility, and speed. It does this by harnes-
sing the same big-data techniques used to develop black-box algorithms to
demonstrate the validity of those algorithms.
Computational verification requires duplicating the critical results of a
black-box algorithm using different input data, different analytical methods,
or both.60 If one team develops a black-box model predicting, say, which
patients are most likely to benefit from a chemotherapy drug, then maybe
those predictions reflect genuine patterns found in nature—or maybe they’re
artifacts of the particular data or methods used to generate the model. But if
a second team, using different data or methods, develops a model that comes
to similar conclusions, then those conclusions are more likely to reflect gen-
uine patterns on which doctors, patients, and insurers can rely. Just how
similar is enough is a hard question. It is impossible to compare directly two
opaque black-box models, since one can’t, for instance, ask whether 120
million variables are weighted the same between the models. But if repre-
sentative patient information is fed to both models and gives similar predic-
tions, then we can be confident that the models are based on natural
phenomena or, at least, the same underlying flaw.
Performing computation verification is conceptually simple, but imple-
menting it is a complex undertaking for both technical and legal reasons. On
the technical side, choosing and obtaining access to the right data and
method presents several challenges that will take researchers years to iron
out. And on the legal side, regulators overseeing black-box medicine face
several important questions about how to verify black-box algorithms, in-
cluding when verification should be encouraged or required, who should
perform that verification, and what data and analytical techniques should be
used for verification. A full discussion of these questions is well beyond the
scope of this article, but we offer some preliminary observations on how
regulators should think about these questions.61
First, though new drugs must be approved before they can be marketed,
it is less clear that pre-market approval should be required for black-box
medicine. Pre-market approval would help ensure that black-box treatments
60. Third parties (or the FDA) could similarly evaluate the procedural quality of an
algorithm’s development, including the relevant expertise of its developers, the quality of
training data, and the like. This procedural validation would require companies to disclose
their developmental parameters, however, which raises intellectual-property and regulatory
questions beyond the scope of this paper. See Price, supra note 42 (discussing companies’
incentives to keep development parameters as trade secrets).
61. For a more detailed consideration of these issues, see Price, supra note 42.
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and diagnostics are safe and effective, but would also impose significant
costs that may retard the development of black-box algorithms or even pre-
vent them from getting off the ground in the first place. And unlike new
pharmaceutical treatments, the safety concerns of black-box medicine are
more attenuated. While pharmaceutical treatments subject patients to chemi-
cals that may or may not work and may or may not have dangerous side
effects, black-box algorithms largely predict risks of developing disease or
help physicians decide how best to treat a disease using existing, FDA-ap-
proved drugs.62 So pre-market approval might be too restrictive a
requirement.
Other approaches could obtain many of the same benefits as pre-market
approval without the downsides. For instance, the FDA could require com-
panies to obtain verification within a specific period of time of introducing a
commercial product based on a black-box algorithm, or upon achieving a
specific sales volume. Or it, or the marketplace, could provide incentives to
verify algorithms without imposing specific requirements. An independent
certification program, for instance, might guide decisions by physicians, in-
surers, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services when consider-
ing whether to prescribe and pay for products based on black-box models.
Such a certification program could be run by independent nonprofits or in-
ternational organizations, or even the FDA itself.
Second, verification should, in most cases, be done by independent third
parties rather than by the original developer of a black-box model. Original
developers are poorly suited to perform validation: though they have the
necessary expertise and relevant data, they are also likely to repeat any er-
rors in the initial development. They also face substantial conflicts of inter-
est, since they are precisely the parties who benefit from verification.
Developers of black-box algorithms have their own incentive to verify their
own models internally, since doing so improves their quality, which will be
reflected in better products. But the point of verification, as seen by patients,
physicians, and insurers, is to avoid the errors and conflicts of interest that
can only be overcome by independent third parties. Independent verification
could be performed by the FDA or NIH, but those agencies generally lack
the necessary expertise in big-data management and computer programming
to develop their own black-box algorithms; nor is doing so their expected
62. It is possible for a black-box model to create safety problems. Consider, again, a
hypothetical model predicting which patients are most likely to benefit from a chemotherapy
drug. A truly terrible black-box model might make predictions that are the opposite of correct,
directing doctors to give the drug to those who would be harmed and to avoid giving the drug
to those who would benefit. Such a model would make things worse off than they were before,
but only marginally; without the model, doctors might prescribe the drug indiscriminately both
to those who would benefit and those who would be harmed. And, of course, if the model
didn’t work, it might be quickly rejected by physicians and insurers.
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strength or mission.63 Instead, validation is likely best undertaken by third
parties with enough expertise to develop algorithms on their own—other
health-care companies, independent research organizations, or academic
researchers.
Encouraging these third parties to perform independent verification is a
key goal, which could be driven by a variety of incentive mechanisms.64 In
particular, mandatory revenue sharing may be appropriate when a third-party
health-care company or research organization verifies a black-box al-
gorithm; similarly, a third party that debunks a black-box algorithm could
collect a bounty paid by the original developer or out of an FDA-adminis-
tered fund. Grants and prizes to fund verification research could also provide
useful incentives, especially for academic institutions capable of verifying
black-box algorithms. Of course, original developers would have strong in-
centives to block third-party verification, when doing so could reveal valua-
ble information or risk lucrative revenue streams. In addition to the
incentives discussed above, then, the FDA would likely need to require com-
panies to facilitate independent verification.65
Third, as explained above, independent verification should be based on
different data or analytical methods than those used to develop the relevant
black-box algorithms. Even with these differences in data and methods,
however, third parties conducting independent verification would still need
broad access to data used to develop black-box algorithms, because the num-
ber of entities capable of developing (and validating) black-box algorithms
is larger than the number capable of assembling large, high-quality health-
care datasets. Sharing and pooling health information while maintaining the
ability of independent verification to avoid false correlations and data arti-
facts can be accomplished in various ways, like sectioning large pools of
health information into subsets used for development and verification.66
63. The FDA’s mission statement recognizes roles in promoting public health and en-
couraging health-care innovation:
FDA is responsible for protecting the public health by assuring the safety, efficacy
and security of human and veterinary drugs, biological products, medical devices,
our nation’s food supply, cosmetics, and products that emit radiation.
FDA is also responsible for advancing the public health by helping to speed innova-
tions that make medicines more effective, safer, and more affordable and by helping
the public get the accurate, science-based information they need to use medicines
and foods to maintain and improve their health.
ABOUT FDA: WHAT WE DO, FDA.gov (last updated Dec. 7, 2015) http://www.fda.gov/
AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/.
64. See Price, Big Data, supra note 38, at 137–50.
65. See also infra Part IV.B (discussing the role of independent gatekeepers to regulate
information sharing for verification).
66. The question of fully independent data is complex. On the one hand, data from
independent sources may be best at ensuring patterns reflect underlying biological truths in-
stead of artifacts of the original dataset. On the other hand, maintaining independent datasets
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The many complex details aside, this is the heart of the accountability
challenge: ensuring the quality of black-box algorithms requires sharing the
health information used to develop the algorithms in the first place.67 But
with that information sharing comes a substantial second challenge: the pri-
vacy of those whose data are gathered in the first place. The next Part details
that challenge.
III. THE PRIVACY CHALLENGE
The second problem that arises from the growth of black-box medicine
is protecting patient privacy. Health care presents substantial privacy chal-
lenges because health information is, unusually, both private and public: it is
personal information about which individuals have strong privacy prefer-
ences, yet is used by others for numerous valuable applications. Black-box
medicine elevates these challenges in several ways. It uses far more informa-
tion than traditional health-care applications; it requires comprehensive ac-
cess to, and wide distribution of, health information; and it generates new
health information that can present its own privacy problems. The resulting
losses of patient privacy, then, can cause significant harms, both from inap-
propriate uses of health information and from effects on patient autonomy
and decisional privacy.
A. Health Information and Patient Privacy
Privacy challenges arise in numerous contexts, from employment his-
tory and consumer credit to family dynamics and sexual relationships. But
the health-care context presents some of the hardest privacy challenges, due
to the nature of health information.
Privacy challenges arise when information has a dual nature: when it is
both sensitive or private enough for interested parties to demand privacy and
necessarily reduces the size of those datasets, increases the cost of developing and maintaining
them, and increases the likelihood of uncompensated biases. See Price, Big Data, supra note
38, at 110–13. One solution, though the details are beyond the scope of this article, might be a
single dataset as large and comprehensive as possible, which developers could independently
segregate into their own “training” and “test” sets. See Jose´ Ramo´n Cano et al., On the Combi-
nation of Evolutionary Algorithms and Stratified Strategies for Training Set Selection in Data
Mining, 6 APPL. SOFT COMPUT. 323 (2006). Different developers would divide the data differ-
ently, mimicking the existence of fully independent datasets.
67. For some of the technical challenges involved in sharing and analyzing large-scale
health data, see Guy Haskin Fernald et al., Bioinformatics Challenges for Personalized
Medicine, 27 Bioinformatics 1741 (2011). For a discussion of the intellectual-property and
incentive issues surrounding access to health-care data, see, e.g., Barbara J. Evans, Sustainable
Access to Data for Postmarketing Medical Product Safety Surveillance under the Amended
HIPAA Privacy Rule, 24 Health Matrix 11 (2014) (discussing access to FDA’s Sentinel
database); Price, Big Data, supra note 38, at 131–35 (discussing the incentives for secrecy of
proprietary health data).
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yet valuable or useful enough for others to want or need access.68 Informa-
tion that is private but has no value to anyone else, like someone’s inner
monologue or get-rich-quick fantasies, doesn’t present significant privacy
challenges because such information can just remain private with no cost or
harm. Information that is valuable but not private, like a company’s SEC
filings or the United States Code, can likewise be made available at no pri-
vacy cost. It’s when information falls between these categories—when there
is a mismatch between the supply and demand for information—that privacy
problems arise.
Health information is a classic example of this phenomenon. Many cate-
gories of health information are considered private by most people, for a
wide variety of reasons. Some, like the details of a patient’s mental-health
treatment or a diagnosis of a sexually transmitted infection, can affect a pa-
tient’s personal or professional relationships. Some, like a patient’s weight,
or photos from a colonoscopy, are just embarrassing or inappropriate when
distributed in the wrong contexts.69 And some, like a patient’s genetic pro-
file, can be used to discriminate in insurance, employment, and other deci-
sions that may turn on someone’s propensity to develop a medical condition.
At the same time, this information also has value to others. Some of this
value is obvious: doctors need it to make diagnoses and provide treatment,
while insurers need it to process claims. Sometimes this value is more atten-
uated, but still socially desirable, like when someone seeks information
about her partner’s sexual health or when a public-health service tracks the
spread of a food-borne illness. And sometimes information is put to uses that
have private value but also social costs, like when an employer discriminates
on the basis of a protected medical condition or (arguably) when a pharma-
68. Privacy scholars have debated in recent years whether health information, or any 
form of information, is inherently “sensitive,” such that it necessarily presents privacy 
problems, or whether the privacy implications of a given category of information depend more 
on the context in which that information is collected, used, or disclosed, or the privacy harms 
that stem from that collection, use, or disclosure. See, e.g., HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN 
CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (2010); Paul Ohm, Sen-
sitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125 (2015); Kirsten Martin & Helen Nissenbaum, 
Measuring Privacy: An Empirical Test Using Context to Expose Confounding Variables 
(forthcoming). We do not take sides in this debate. Whether health information is inherently 
sensitive, or whether patients consider any particular category of information to be sensitive, it 
is clear that many types of health information present privacy issues, meaning that their collec-
tion, use, or disclosure can lead to privacy harms. See infra Part III.C. Some forms of health 
information undoubtedly present greater privacy issues than others—as the joke goes, everyone 
knows someone in therapy, while no one has ever met anyone who has visited a proctologist—
but in the aggregate, health information presents enough privacy issues that protecting patient 
privacy is a critical issue for researchers developing black-box algorithms.
69. See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 158–61 (2008); Nis-
senbaum, supra note 68, at 221 (“[I]nformation . . . online, particularly if taken out of a local 
context, may be embarrassing or cause . . . harm.”).
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ceutical company markets a drug to people suffering from a medical
condition.
The law has taken steps to protect patient privacy in some, but not all,
circumstances. In the United States, health privacy is governed, in large part,
by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the
Department of Health and Human Services’ implementing Privacy Rule.70
Under the Privacy Rule, most health-care providers, insurance companies,
and information clearinghouses may not use or disclose identifiable health
information unless that information falls within one of several listed catego-
ries.71 These include using information to provide care or obtain payment,
using information for quality-improvement efforts, disclosing information in
response to a legal requirement, and disclosing or using information with a
patient’s consent.72 The Privacy Rule also provides that in most contexts,
other than use to provide care, the amount of information disclosed must be
the minimum necessary, preventing most bulk disclosures of information.73
Deidentified data—data that has been stripped of its personally identifiable
information—is not, however, governed by the Privacy Rule, leading to its
frequent use in health research.74 This has upsides and downsides: it makes
more information available to researchers, but deidentified data from differ-
ent sources is much harder to combine into unified databases.75 Furthermore,
deidentified data can often be reidentified, leading to new privacy losses.76
70. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 (1996); 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164 (2016).
71. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.103, 164.502 (2016) (defining covered entities and protected
health information, and prohibiting unauthorized use or disclosure of protected health informa-
tion, respectively).
72. See 48 C.F.R. § 164.506 (2016).
73. See 48 C.F.R. § 164.502(b) (2016).
74. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514 (2013) (exempting de-identified data).
75. See INST. OF MED., BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE: ENHANCING PRIVACY, IM-
PROVING HEALTH THROUGH RESEARCH 177-79 (Sharyl J. Nass, Laura A. Levit & Lawrence O.
Gostin eds., 2009) (“[B]ecause datasets from multiple sources cannot be linked to generate a
more complete record of a patient’s health history without a unique identifier, such datasets
often are of minimal value to researchers and are not frequently used.”).
76. See, e.g., Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising
Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1716 (2010) (“About fifteen years ago,
researchers started to chip away at the robust anonymization assumption, the foundation upon
which this state of affairs has been built. Recently, however, they have done more than chip
away; they have essentially blown it up, casting serious doubt on the power of anonymization,
proving its theoretical limits and establishing . . .  the easy reidentification result.”); Paul M.
Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally
Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1841–45 (2011) (“Technology increasingly
enables the combination of various pieces of non-PII to produce PII. . . . The more information
about a person that is known, the more likely it becomes that this information can be used to
identify that person or to determine further data about her. When aggregated, information has a
way of producing more information, such that de-identification of data becomes more difficult.
Thus, it becomes possible to look for overlap in the data and then to link up different bodies of
data.”); Felix T. Wu, Defining Privacy and Utility in Data Sets, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1117,
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Other laws also play roles in governing health privacy. In the federal
system, for instance, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008
prohibits discrimination in employment or health-insurance decisions on the
basis of genetic information.77 With employer-provided health plans, the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) also plays a
role, preempting many state provisions that might otherwise affect patient
privacy.78 And state tort law has long imposed duties of confidentiality on
physicians and others treating patients, as have some state statutes, either in
specific domains or comprehensively.79
B. The Privacy Challenge of Black-Box Medicine
Health information presents difficult privacy challenges, but those chal-
lenges are multiplied by the growth of black-box medicine, for at least four
reasons.
Mass quantities of health information. First, black-box medicine re-
quires enormous quantities of health information, expanding greatly the
1127-28 (2013) (discussing well-publicized instances in which researchers showed how to re-
identify individuals in supposedly anonymous data). For computer-science literature on identi-
fication of individuals using purportedly anonymous data, see, e.g., Arvind Narayanan & 
Vitaly Shmatikov, Robust De-anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets, in PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE 2008 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY 111–125 (2008) (“[V]ery little auxil-
iary information is needed [to] deanonymize an average subscriber record from the Netflix 
Prize dataset.”); Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye et al., Unique in the Shopping Mall: On the 
Reidentifiability of Credit Card Metadata, 347 SCI. 536 (2015) (“We study 3 months of credit 
card records for 1.1 million people and show that four spatiotemporal points are enough to 
uniquely reidentify 90% of individuals.”); Latanya Sweeney, k-Anonymity: A Model For Pro-
tecting Privacy, 10 INT’L J. ON UNCERTAINTY, FUZZINESS & KNOWLEDGE-BASED SYS. 557 
(2002) (“[I]n most of these cases, . . . remaining data can be used to re-identify individuals by 
linking or matching the data to other data or by looking at unique characteristics found in the 
released data.”); Latanya Sweeney, Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely 
(Carnegie Mellon Univ., Working Paper No. 3, 2000), available at http://dataprivacylab.org/ 
projects/identifiability/paper1.pdf (“[C]ombinations of few characteristics often combine in 
populations to uniquely or nearly uniquely identify some individuals. Clearly, data released 
containing such information about these individuals should not be considered anonymous.”).
77. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 
881 (2008).
78. See Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936 (2016) (holding that ERISA 
preempts a Vermont law requiring health-care providers and insurers to report claims informa-
tion for inclusion in a state-run database).
79. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 56-56.37 (West 2014) (imposing broad confidentiality 
duties on health-care providers and plans); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 17 (LexisNexis 2016)
(prohibiting nonconsensual disclosure of medical records of minors relating to abortion and 
STIs); Pennsylvania Drug and Alcohol Abuse Control Act, 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1690.108 
(1972) (prohibiting nonconsensual disclosure of medical records related to treatment programs 
for alcohol or drug abuse); McCormick v. England, 494 S.E. 2d 431, 439 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997)
(recognizing the tort of breach of confidentiality by a physician); Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 803 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (awarding tort damages where insurer 
induced doctor to divulge confidential patient information, thus breaching the doctor’s duty of 
loyalty owed to the patient).
Fall 2016] Privacy and Accountability in Black-Box Medicine 25
amount of patient information that must be collected and used. This quantity
problem arises in two separate dimensions: black-box medicine depends
both on having access to medical information about many individuals—
thousands or perhaps millions of patients—and on having access to many
distinct data points about each individual. Having such massive amounts of
data is key because black-box medicine works by finding subtle correlations
between patient characteristics and medical diagnoses or treatments. But
there are so many patient variables that could be relevant to any given medi-
cal condition—whether from genetic testing, bloodwork and other labora-
tory tests, environmental characteristics, or other sources of variation—that
machine-learning algorithms must analyze enormous amounts of data to
draw useful inferences. Otherwise, with so many variables, false correlations
would arise simply by coincidence and overfitting.
Comprehensive health information. Second, black-box medicine can re-
quire access to comprehensive health information. Comprehensiveness
comes in different forms. In one form, this means that a dataset cannot sys-
tematically exclude certain categories of patients, since doing so would in-
troduce a significant source of error. In this sense, comprehensiveness is just
a variation on the quantity problem described above. But more importantly,
it means that data from many different providers must be shared and com-
bined into larger, unified datasets. Since this requires transferring sensitive
medical information from different providers to a central repository, it opens
up avenues for malicious actors to gain access to information as it is being
transmitted. And it amplifies the benefits of doing so, since a single attack
can gain access to far more information than in a decentralized system.
Broad distribution of health information. Third, black-box medicine can
require distribution of health information to numerous recipients, from doc-
tors and other health-care providers to laboratories performing analysis and
testing to researchers investigating potential correlations. Much of this distri-
bution has not previously been required. In the traditional pre-big-data ap-
proach to health care, for instance, a doctor might learn from a published
study about a new treatment for a condition. She could then try that treat-
ment on her patients without conveying information about those patients to
others. In the age of black-box medicine, though, the doctor may send a
patient’s genetic information to a third party to be analyzed using a black-
box model. If that model indicates the optimal treatment, this process would
give better health outcomes. But it would also mean that sensitive informa-
tion is in more hands than under the traditional approach.
Both of these latter two reasons mean that in the age of black-box
medicine, health information is far more often susceptible to interception or
misuse. And this is true for a wide variety of actors, from criminals hacking
into servers to marketers selling new treatments. With so much data being
collected about so many people, and being transmitted to and possessed by
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so many recipients, the risk is necessarily greater that data will be used for
purposes beyond those originally intended.
Creation of new health information. Fourth, black-box medicine leads to
the creation of new health information that wouldn’t have existed otherwise,
in the form of the precise inferences that it enables.80 For instance, when
researchers identify genes that are linked with specific diseases, like the
BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations that indicate a high risk of developing breast
or ovarian cancer, then that finding creates a new kind of medical inference
about people with that genetic profile. The BRCA mutations provide unusu-
ally strong correlations, but the point holds even in murkier circumstances:
If a black-box model suggests that a patient is likely to develop heart disease
or diabetes, or is unlikely to respond to a cheap medicine but likelier to
respond to a costlier one, those probabilities and susceptibilities to treatment
are relevant medical facts in which the patient, her physicians, and her insur-
ers all have strong interests.
And much of this new information presents the same privacy issues as
other kinds of health information. This is obviously true when the informa-
tion has financial consequences, as when it can lead to discrimination in
insurance or employment decisions. But even when money isn’t at stake,
information in the form of black-box predictions can lead to the same kinds
of privacy harms as other forms of health information.81
Protecting privacy in black-box medicine, then, is a difficult challenge
both because of the amount and nature of the information in play and be-
cause that information often must travel on distributed networks of health-
care providers, pharmaceutical companies, academic and government re-
searchers, and others. And since these characteristics of black-box medicine
are necessary to obtain its utility, solutions are unlikely to come simply from
reducing the amount of information or limiting its distribution.
C. Privacy Harms from Black-Box Medicine
A tempting response to these difficulties is to conclude that privacy be
damned, the benefits of black-box medicine are so promising that patients
should get comfortable with the costs. There is some merit to this view.
Concerns about health privacy may be attenuated in the context of black-box
medicine, since the massive amounts of data needed mean that the odds that
any one patient’s information will ever be seen or used by any person are
low. Still, there are reasons people consider health information to be espe-
cially sensitive. One reason, though not the only one, is that losses of medi-
cal privacy can lead to four kinds of harms.
80. See Roger Allan Ford, Unilateral Invasions of Privacy, 91 N.D. L. REV. 1075,
1088-90 (2016); but see Jeffery M. Skopek, Privacy in Numbers? (on file with authors) (argu-
ing that predictions and inferences may not appropriately be considered as privacy violations).
81. See infra Part III.C.
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One class of privacy harms arises when a privacy loss causes what Ryan
Calo has called objective privacy harms—objective, real-world conse-
quences from the collection, disclosure, or use of information.82 Many of
these harms are financial. If a patient’s medical records indicate she is suf-
fering from an expensive-to-treat illness, for instance, then an insurer might
use that information to deny her coverage, or a potential employer might use
it to deny her a job, or a scammer might use it to sell her a snake-oil cure.
But privacy losses can also lead to non-financial objective privacy harms.
Disclosure of medical records showing that someone suffers from a sexually
transmitted infection, for instance, or that someone’s child has an unex-
pected biological parent, is likely to hurt the subject’s reputation or family
relations, even if it leads to no immediate financial loss.83 It is relatively
uncontroversial that these privacy harms are genuine harms that reasonably
could, in many cases, merit compensation; they are, however, probably the
rarest category of privacy harms.
A second class of privacy harms consists of subjective privacy harms—
harms that are perceived, internally, by an information subject but that have
no immediate real-world consequences.84 These can range from mild to se-
vere and consist of numerous distinct kinds of suffering—discomfort, em-
barrassment, paranoia, mental pain. There is extensive psychological
evidence that these kinds of feelings inflict genuine harm.85 That is why
intentional infliction of emotional distress is a cause of action, or why even
the threat of unwanted physical contact is recognized as the tort of assault.86
And losses of privacy in the health-care context are especially likely to cause
this sort of privacy harm, since health information is so personal and
sensitive.
82. M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1147–52
(2011).
83. See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 69, at 174–79. For real-life examples of such privacy
breaches, see, e.g., Doe v. Medlantic Health Care Group, 814 A.2d 939, 947 (D.C. Ct. App.
2003) (finding that a hospital violated its duty of confidentiality by sharing Doe’s HIV-posi-
tive status, which led to ostracism at work); Yath v. Fairview Clinics, 767 N.W.2d 34, 50
(Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that a clinic employee violated his duty of confidentiality when
he posted information about the plaintiff’s STI status and extramarital affair on the Internet).
Lawmakers have occasionally targeted disclosure of such information. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§§ 290dd-3, 390ee-3 (imposing requirements on the disclosure of information relating to treat-
ment programs for drug and alcohol abuse); Timothy S. Jost, Constraints on Sharing Mental
Health and Substance-Use Treatment Information Imposed by Federal and State Medical
Records Privacy Laws in INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE (US) COMMITTEE ON CROSSING THE QUAL-
ITY CHASM: ADAPTATION TO MENTAL HEALTH AND ADDICTIVE DISORDERS (Washington DC:
National Academies Press, 2006) (describing state and federal restrictions on information
sharing).
84. Calo, supra note 82, at 1142–47.
85. SOLOVE, supra note 69, at 174–79.
86. Id. at 176.
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A third class of privacy harms arises when the loss of privacy deprives
people of their dignity, personhood, or individual autonomy. Like those in
the first two classes of privacy harms, these harms are personal rather than
social, but they represent a group of harms that are more abstract than those
in the first two categories. Privacy is valuable, in part, because it represents a
respect for the capabilities of individuals to make decisions, develop rela-
tionships, experience emotions, and generally live autonomous lives. With-
out a private realm in which to exercise these and other fundamental human
capabilities, there is a real risk that people will lose key elements of individ-
ual liberty.87 Indeed, this is a central justification for the Supreme Court’s
cases on a constitutional right to decisional privacy.88 Eliminating privacy in
this personal realm, then, would threaten to deprive individuals of the ability
to live autonomous lives and exercise fundamental human capabilities.
A fourth class of privacy harms, and the broadest category of harms,
follows when the absence of privacy alters behavior in a way that hurts indi-
viduals or society. Privacy creates environments that foster cooperation,
trust, and confidence; without privacy, people are likely to be far more
guarded in their interactions, or to avoid interactions that would benefit soci-
ety.89 In Jaffee v. Redmond,90 for instance, the Supreme Court recognized an
evidentiary privilege for conversations between psychotherapists and pa-
tients in part because confidentiality can be necessary for therapy to work in
the first place. The Court explained that “[e]ffective psychotherapy . . . de-
pends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is
willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memo-
ries, and fears,” so that “the mere possibility of disclosure may impede de-
87. This is an application of the capabilities approach, which posits that individual well-
being is a function of individual ability to do and be those things that are valuable. For back-
ground on the capabilities approach, see, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILI-
TIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH (2011) (positing core capabilities of life, bodily
health, bodily integrity, emotions, practical reason, control over one’s environment, and so
forth); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES AP-
PROACH 72–80 (2000); AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (1985); Alexander A.
Boni-Saenz, Personal Delegations, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 1231, 1233–34 (2013). On human
capabilities and privacy, see Martha C. Nussbaum, Sex Equality, Liberty, and Privacy: A Com-
parative Approach to the Feminist Critique, in INDIA’S LIVING CONSTITUTION: IDEAS, PRAC-
TICES, CONTROVERSIES 242 (Zoya Hasan et al. eds., 2002).
88. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“Our
law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. . . . These matters, involving
the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
89. On this public-good nature of privacy, see Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy,
and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2084–90 (2004).
90. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996).
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velopment of the confidential relationship necessary for successful
treatment.”91
Similar issues arise in myriad other contexts, even when the subject
matter is not so personal. When two businesses sign a nondisclosure agree-
ment, for instance, before negotiating a contract or entering into a joint pro-
ject, the privacy environment created by the NDA allows the businesses to
disclose confidential information—necessary for the negotiations or project
to succeed—without sacrificing the value of the confidentiality. Without the
promise of privacy, many of these valuable interactions—between doctor
and patient or lovers or business partners—might never happen, or might be
irredeemably tainted by exposure to the world. By recognizing and protect-
ing privacy in these kinds of contexts, then, the law creates an environment
that encourages and protects the formation of these partnerships in their most
vulnerable times.92
IV. RECONCILING PRIVACY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
The last two Parts explained the challenges that algorithmic accountabil-
ity and patient privacy present for black-box medicine. These problems are
not unsolvable. Similar problems in traditional medicine have been ad-
dressed, to greater or lesser success, by the FDA’s drug-approval process
and the HIPAA privacy rule. These problems are, however, harder to solve
than they may seem at first glance, because efforts to combat one will usu-
ally make the other worse. Efforts to address accountability or privacy, then,
must consider the effects on the other problem. This Part suggests ways to
do so. After describing the interaction effect between the two problems, it
suggests three pillars for protecting patient privacy while permitting data to
be used for algorithmic verification. It concludes with a short case study of a
related debate about access to information: the debate over access to clinical-
trial information.
A. Patient Privacy Versus Algorithmic Accountability
The twin goals of algorithmic accountability and patient privacy are fun-
damentally at odds in black-box medicine, such that efforts to make one
better will, in most instances, make the other worse. The close relationship
between the privacy and accountability challenges arises because both stem
from the massive datasets needed for black-box medicine to work.
Verifying black-box medical algorithms requires giving third parties ac-
cess to large amounts of health information about thousands or millions of
patients. Large amounts of data are needed because black-box algorithms
and the human body are so complex that false positives and dead ends are
91. Id. at 10.
92. See 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/3 & 50/4 (imposing a duty of confidentiality on physi-
cians and providing civil penalties for the disclosure of confidential information).
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common, so you need a lot of data to be confident that correlations are legiti-
mate. And providing that data to third parties helps avoid conflicts of interest
and ensure accountability in the verification process.93 A verification process
performed by a pharmaceutical company offering a new diagnostic test, for
instance, would face different questions than one performed by the FDA or
an independent academic researcher, since relying on the company that
would benefit from the test creates a conflict of interest that would not exist
with an independent verification.94
This conflict of interest is not new. Clinical trials for new diagnostic
tests or devices have long been typically conducted by developers of those
products, who have interests in seeing their products approved for market.
Though several mechanisms are used to combat these conflicts of interest,
these mechanisms would likely prove ineffective with black-box medicine.
The FDA subjects clinical trials to strict rules,95 including a requirement that
all clinical trial materials—not just summaries or positive results—be sub-
mitted for independent review,96 and another that all clinical trials be regis-
tered to avoid the suppression of negative results.97 There have also been
recent calls for greater disclosure of clinical-trial data to non-regulators, to
permit more independent third-party analysis.98 These measures are typically
undergirded by scientific understanding of a drug or device’s mechanism,
which help ensure that it is an effective treatment. These mechanisms to
combat conflicts of interest, though, don’t work with black-box medicine;
first-principles scientific understanding is unavailable because of the opaque
93. See supra Part II.B.
94. Further conflicts of interest can arise when the investigators conducting the trials
have their own financial interests in the success of the company or the product. See Peter 
Whoriskey, As drug industry’s influence over research grows, so does the potential for bias, 
WASHINGTON POST  (Nov.  24, 2012),  https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/as-
drug-industrys-influence-over-research-grows-so-does-the-potential-for-bias/2012/11/24/bb64 
d596-1264-11e2-be82-c3411b7680a9_story.html.
95. See Selected FDA GCP/Clinical Trial Guidance Documents, FDA, http://www.
fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/RunningClinicalTrials/GuidancesInformationSheets 
andNotices/ucm219433.htm (last updated Aug. 12, 2016) (listing fifty guidance documents for 
sponsors of clinical trials).
96. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (2015) (describing in detail the required content for a New 
Drug Application).
97. See 42 U.S.C. § 282(j) (2012) (establishing a “clinical trials registration data bank,” 
later implemented as ClinicalTrials.gov). This requirement, though, is frequently flouted. See 
Charles Piller, Law Ignored, Patients at Risk, STAT NEWS (Dec. 13, 2015), http://www. 
statnews.com/2015/12/13/investigation/ (finding that among all institutions conducting 20 or 
more clinical trials since 2008, only two companies were at least 50% compliant with re-
quirements to report results within one year of study completion or termination).
98. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., SHARING CLINICAL TRIAL DATA: MAXIMIZING BENEFITS, 
MINIMIZING RISK (2015), available at http://nap.edu/18998 [hereinafter IOM, Sharing 
Clinical Trial Data]; Richard Lehman & Elizabeth Loder, Missing Clinical Trial Data, 344 
BRIT. MED. J. d8158 (2012); Mary Beth Hamel et al., Preparing for Responsible Sharing of 
Clinical Trial Data, 369 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1651 (2013).
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nature of black-box algorithms, and clinical trials are too expensive and too
limited to be used for most algorithms. Third-party independent validation,
then, is a necessary tool to overcome companies’ conflicts of interest and
ensure the quality and accuracy of black-box algorithms, and this means that
large amounts of patient data must be made available to third parties.
Patient privacy works in the reverse direction, since both of these re-
quirements for accountability—the large amount of information and the
need to disclose it to third parties—lead to greater privacy problems. The
more information that’s collected, disclosed, and used, the greater the raw
material for future privacy problems and the more serious those problems
are likely to be when they do occur. If a doctor’s office or hospital system,
for instance, collects genetic profiles or detailed sexual histories for its pa-
tients, then a data breach is likely to be far more serious and lead to far
greater privacy losses than if it just collected blood pressure and cholesterol
readings. And the more often information is disclosed to third parties, the
more likely privacy problems are to occur in the first place. This is the case
both because the number of people who can cause a privacy problem is
greater and because disclosures themselves—whether of paper or electronic
media or by internet transmission—provide opportunities for data breaches
and similar privacy problems. And the use of patient information can also
lead to privacy problems because it results in the creation of new health
information, which further exacerbates the privacy problems.
Because this relationship between accountability and privacy arises
from the fundamental big-data nature of black-box medicine, severing the
link between the two is unlikely to work. The trick, then, is to identify the
best ways to balance the two interests. The next subpart discusses ways of
doing so.
B. Three Pillars for Privacy-Preserving Accountability
Accountability and privacy in black-box medicine may be structurally
opposed, but that doesn’t mean that every effort to improve one of those
values will affect the other to the same extent. Some efforts to promote ac-
countability may destroy patient privacy, while other efforts may have only
incidental effects on privacy. Likewise, some efforts to protect patient pri-
vacy will prove greater obstacles to accountability than other efforts.
To foster adoption by doctors and patients, reimbursement by insurers,
and approval by regulators, developers of black-box algorithms must
demonstrate their quality and reliability.99 As described above, third-party
verification is likely to be a crucial part of this process. The question is how
companies can validate black-box algorithms without destroying patient pri-
vacy. This subsection identifies three pillars of a framework that policymak-
99. See supra Part II.A, II.C.
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ers should use to preserve patient privacy with minimal downside for
accountability, and vice-versa.
Substantive restrictions on data collection, use, and disclosure. The first
pillar for protecting privacy while promoting accountability is a system of
specific restrictions on the collection, use, and disclosure of patient data, so
that those behaviors are not left to the free market. There are two reasons for
this. One is that the privacy interests at stake are so great, given the potential
privacy harms from the collection, use, or disclosure of patient health infor-
mation. And the other is that companies’ incentives are badly misaligned
with those privacy interests. There is little incentive not to gather as much
data as possible, whether or not it is useful for providing health care or
developing and verifying black-box algorithms. Electronic storage is cheap,
and even the risk of liability due to a data breach is minimized by court
rulings making it difficult to bring data-breach lawsuits.100 In industries like
telecommunications and online services, companies are incented to purge
information periodically to reduce the burden of responding to subpoenas
and law-enforcement requests, but those burdens are minimal in the health-
care industry. And once data is gathered, even for legitimate purposes, com-
panies can benefit from using that data for other, borderline or illegitimate
purposes, like marketing, discrimination, or even sale to data brokers.
The collection and use of patient health information present the most
difficult regulatory challenges, because black-box medicine needs large
amounts of health information to work. The whole point of black-box algo-
rithms is that it is impossible to know, ex ante, what factors will be corre-
lated with medical risks, effective treatments, or patient outcomes. This
makes it critical to collect large amounts of medical information. At the
same time, this information reveals so much about individual patients that
large datasets could be easily abused. And nonmedical information, like
marketing and billing information, likely plays no legitimate role in develop-
ing and verifying black-box algorithms.
Regulations that govern the collection and use of information for devel-
oping and verifying black-box algorithms, then, should permit broad collec-
tion of medical information. At the same time, they should require that
information to be segregated from information used for non-black-box pur-
poses and should prohibit its transfer for non-black-box uses. There are dif-
ferent ways to do this, but one simple method would be to require companies
100. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l., 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) (holding that federal
courts lacked Article III standing based on “hypothetical future harm that is not certainly
impending”); In re Science Applications Int’l Corp. Backup Tape Data Theft Litigation, 45 F.
Supp. 3d 14 (D.D.C. 2014) (holding that the increased risk of identity theft after information
about customers was stolen does not give rise to an injury in fact supporting Article III stand-
ing); but see Krottner v. Starbucks Corp, 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding Article III
standing when plaintiffs “alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from
the theft of a laptop containing their unencrypted personal data”).
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developing black-box algorithms to use segregated write-only data vaults
that can freely accept new data and be used to develop or verify algorithms
but cannot export data for other uses.101 Collection, use, and disclosure of
data outside of these data vaults would continue to be governed by HIPAA
and other laws. Because the data vaults would contain so much health infor-
mation, they would be subject to heightened black-box regulations and
would be the only data sources that companies and researchers could use to
develop and verify black-box algorithms.
Regulations should also work to ensure that the data collected avoids
bias due to selection effects. For instance, datasets should contain the same
information about each patient, with the included data points selected ac-
cording to neutral criteria, rather than just incorporating whatever data one
can throw at the problem. Otherwise, there is a risk that differences in health
information will introduce bias that could affect the resulting black-box al-
gorithms. For instance, researchers have documented differences in physi-
cians’ pain-management treatment of black and white patients.102 Similar
differences in treatments, diagnostic tests ordered, physician notes, or even
patients’ propensity to seek medical treatment, whether from discrimination
or from any other cause, could lead to systematic distortions of black-box
algorithms.103 The best way to counter these distortions is to rely on datasets
that systematically capture the same information for each member of a repre-
sentative group. The Precision Medicine Initiative and Million Veteran Pro-
gram are valuable steps in this direction.104
Regulations of data disclosures present their own difficulties. The sim-
plest, and least controversial, regulations would forbid using data for pur-
poses beyond those commensurate with the purposes for which the data was
101. Write-only data vaults are not, though, a panacea. First, they are difficult to imple-
ment technologically, so their write-only nature would likely need to be enforced by data-use
policies. The temptation to use patient health information for other purposes, though, like
solving crimes, determining paternity, or even marketing new drugs, could be too great for
policy-makers and companies developing black-box algorithms to withstand. And even if reg-
ulations hold, it is sometimes possible to reverse-engineer data from the outcome of an al-
gorithm. One study, for instance, demonstrated that a machine-learning algorithm predicting
optimal dosage of the drug warfarin could be inverted to predict patient genotypes based on
the predicted dosage. See Matthew Fredrikson et al., Privacy in Pharmacogenetics: An End-to-
End Case Study of Personalized Warfarin Dosing, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 23RD USENIX
SECURITY SYMPOSIUM 17 (2014). Truly opaque black-box algorithms would resist such reverse
engineering, but it can be difficult to know if an algorithm is truly opaque, or if it just hasn’t
been successfully reverse engineered yet.
102. See Kelly M. Hoffman et al., Racial Bias in Pain Assessment and Treatment Recom-
mendations, and False Beliefs about Biological Differences between Blacks and Whites, 113
PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. OF SCIS. 4296 (2016) (finding that African-Americans are systematically
undertreated for pain relative to white Americans, due to false beliefs about biological differ-
ences between blacks and whites).
103. See Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming
2017).
104. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
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collected. Data that has been used to develop and verify black-box algo-
rithms, then, could be used to verify those algorithms or, perhaps, to develop
new algorithms, but couldn’t be used for marketing. But restrictions of this
kind may not do enough to protect privacy, since detailed patient-specific
information could still wind up in numerous hands, with regulations and
contractual restrictions acting as imperfect restraints on behavior. And be-
cause this data presents so many privacy issues—deidentification is essen-
tially impossible with the sorts of granular genetic data used to develop
black-box algorithms105—imperfect restraints could quickly turn into no
restraints.
A stronger approach would be to tailor the degree of access parties have
to their needs and to encourage data collectors to make data available in
more granular forms. Much work developing and verifying algorithms, for
instance, does not require handing over raw data, but could work perfectly
well with access to query-and-response systems.106 Using these systems,
third parties developing algorithms could submit test algorithms to an inter-
face offered by a data collector and receive the output from executing those
algorithms on real patient data, without providing those third parties access
to that patient data.107 Or, third parties testing algorithms on new data could
submit that data to a black-box algorithm and receive the results without
access to the details of the underlying algorithm. Such query-and-response
systems would not work all the time, but when they do, they can help mini-
mize the amount of patient information transmitted and disclosed to third
105. In other contexts, experts have recommended deidentification of patient data to pro-
tect privacy. We do not do so here, for two reasons. First, the power of black-box medicine 
comes from its ability to find patterns in large amounts of patient data. It is impossible to know 
ex ante, then, what information can be removed without degrading the resulting black-box 
algorithm, with trivial exceptions like name and zip code. Accordingly, deidentification risks 
producing substantively worse health-care outcomes. And second, reidentification is a signifi-
cant-enough risk with any deidentification scheme that deidentification can act as a false se-
curity blanket, reassuring individuals that privacy risks are lower than they are. See generally 
INST. OF MED., supra note 74.
106. The same can be true of verification. See, e.g., Philip Adler et al., Auditing Black-
box Models by Obscuring Features, http://arxiv.org/abs/1602.07043 (Feb. 23, 2016).
107. Such an approach was used for the Netflix Prize, a contest in which Netflix offered 
independent developers a $1 million prize for improving its movie-recommendation algorithm. 
Netflix made a training dataset available to developers and let them test algorithms against a 
larger dataset of customer ratings, which was not otherwise available to developers. E.g., Jason 
Kincaid, The Netflix Prize Comes To A Buzzer-Beater, Nailbiting Finish, TechCrunch, https:// 
techcrunch.com/2009/07/26/the-netflix-prize-comes-to-a-buzzer-beater-nailbiting-finish/ (Jul. 
26, 2009). The Netflix Prize story has a cautionary coda, though: Even the training 
dataset had enough data to identify several individuals, when combined with another dataset 
like IMDB’s review database. See Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Robust De-
anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets, in Proc. of 29th IEEE Symposium on Security and 
Privacy 111-125 (2008); Ryan Siegel, Netflix Spilled Your Brokeback Mountain Secret, Law-
suit Claims, Wired, https://www.wired.com/2009/12/netflix-privacy-lawsuit/ (Dec. 17, 
2009).
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parties. And when they don’t work, there are also data-science techniques
that can minimize third parties’ access to sensitive patient data while still
providing the ability to use that data. Homomorphic-encryption systems, for
instance, allow analysis to be done on encrypted data, giving encrypted re-
sults that can then be decrypted without providing access to the decrypted
data. These schemes are relatively immature, but they have been used to
permit confidentiality-preserving big-data analysis.108
Independent gatekeepers governing access to patient data and black-
box models. The second pillar is a system of independent data gatekeepers to
determine when, and under what conditions, researchers can get access to
patient data and black-box medical models. These independent gatekeepers
could be government entities located in agencies like the Food and Drug
Administration or National Institutes of Health or could be parts of interna-
tional or nongovernmental organizations like the World Health Organiza-
tion. Regardless, the key is that companies that develop black-box
algorithms not have free rein to decide what patient data to collect, use, and
disseminate, and how to do so, since those companies’ incentives are badly
misaligned with patient privacy and since the privacy interests at stake are so
great. Instead, independent assessment of a plan for data-sharing would help
ensure that the privacy interests of patients are considered, not just private
commercial considerations.
There are different ways to design a system of independent gatekeepers.
Gatekeepers could have authority to require companies to collect, use, or
disseminate specific data in specific ways or could simply authorize volun-
tary actions by companies. A comprehensive and mandatory system, like the
FDA’s drug-approval process, could pair regulatory approval of products
based on black-box algorithms with requirements for what data collection
must take place, how that data must be stored and used, what verification
steps must occur, and who must perform that verification. Such a system
could require premarket approval, could condition approval of a black-box
model on independent verification within a set time frame, or could use mar-
ket mechanisms or other non-mandate incentives to encourage verification.
Or, a system tailored to protecting privacy without comprehensively regulat-
ing algorithmic medical products, like the HIPAA privacy rule or any of a
variety of other domain-specific privacy laws, could place limits on compa-
nies’ collection, use, and disclosure of data while leaving algorithmic verifi-
cation to the FDA or someone else.
Either way, companies should be required to obtain advance permission
from the independent gatekeeper before collecting, disclosing, and using pa-
108. See Julian James Stephen et al., Practical Confidentiality Preserving Big Data Anal-
ysis, in  6TH  USENIX  WORKSHOP ON HOT TOPICS IN CLOUD COMPUTING (2014), available 
at https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/hotcloud14/hotcloud14-stephen.pdf   (prov-
iding a proof of concept of the “ability to maintain sensitive data only in an encrypted form 
in the cloud and still perform meaningful data analysis”).
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tient information in the ways most likely to lead to privacy losses.109 This
means, at least, before making specific uses of patient data or disclosing that
data to third parties. And before granting that permission, an independent
gatekeeper should balance patient privacy interests with the need for verifi-
cation and the specific techniques of data collection, storage, use, and disclo-
sure that a company proposes to use. A company should not hand over raw
patient data, for instance, if a query-and-response system would accomplish
the same goal.
Information-security requirements. The third pillar is a system of secur-
ity requirements governing the storage and transmission of medical informa-
tion. While the first two pillars are designed to avoid privacy losses due to
the actions of researchers developing or verifying black-box models, this
pillar is designed to avoid losses due to third parties. As near-daily reports of
data breaches make clear, the most acute threats to privacy may not be the
actions of those with legitimate access to personal information, but instead
the actions of criminals who obtain that information illegally. And the same
may be true in black-box medicine: If researchers developing or verifying
black-box models maintain or transfer the underlying data insecurely, then it
doesn’t much matter what those with legitimate access do because criminals
will soon have free rein to use patient information as they wish.
A detailed guide to modern security practices is beyond the scope of this
article,110 but there are several basic practices that should be included in any
security plan involving sensitive information like patient health data. That
information should be protected with strong encryption in both storage and
transmission. Access should be limited to individuals with legitimate needs
and should be person-specific so access can be monitored and revoked. Sys-
tems should use two-factor authentication instead of easy-to-guess pass-
109. Such permission could act as a reasonable substitute for consent from each patient
or information subject. Requiring individual consent from a patient before health information
is included in a dataset from which black-box algorithms are developed could, in some circum-
stances, impose significant obstacles to algorithm development. Cf. Clinical Research and the
HIPAA Privacy Rule, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH (Feb. 2004), https://privacyruleandresearch.
nih.gov/pdf/clin_research.pdf. Relying on patient consent can also create bias in the
dataset, as patients willing to consent differ from those unwilling to consent. See INSTITUTE OF 
MEDICINE, BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE: ENHANCING PRIVACY, IMPROVING HEALTH 
THROUGH RESEARCH, 209–14 (2009). In some cases, though, as in the case of comprehensive
volunteer datasets assembled for no reason other than algorithm development, individual con-
sent may be more appropriate or even necessary.
110. A good place to start would be several standards from the International Organization
for Standardization and the International Electrotechnical Commission governing privacy and
security of data stored in cloud systems. See ISO/IEC 27001: INFORMATION SECURITY MAN-
AGEMENT SYSTEMS - REQUIREMENTS (2013); ISO/IEC 27002: CODE OF PRACTICE FOR INFOR-
MATION SECURITY CONTROLS (2013); ISO/IEC 27017: CODE OF PRACTICE FOR INFORMATION 
SECURITY CONTROLS BASED ON ISO/IEC 27002 FOR CLOUD SERVICES (2015); ISO/IEC 27018:
CODE OF PRACTICE FOR PROTECTION OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION (PII) IN PUB-
LIC CLOUDS ACTING AS PII PROCESSORS (2014).
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words. Access logs should be kept and routinely monitored for unusual
access patterns. Individuals with access should receive security training, in-
cluding training on social engineering and other factors that lead to security
breaches. That training should be refreshed periodically.
Most critically, these security practices must be continuously updated,
since tools and techniques that are sufficient when adopted can be out of
date weeks or months later, as security vulnerabilities are discovered. This
need for constant updating presents problems for regulators, since rules set-
ting forth specific requirements can only be updated so often. One solution
has been to rely on industry standards, which can evolve over time, rather
than detailed regulations. In lieu of specific security regulations, for in-
stance, the Federal Trade Commission has relied on quasi-common-law en-
forcement of reasonable security standards, an approach the Third Circuit
blessed in 2015.111 Such an approach might work with black-box medicine,
though it would be harder than in other contexts, since the harm from a
breach would be greater. Rather than rely on reasonable industry-standard
practices, then, a rule would need to require something like best practices,
which are harder and more expensive to maintain. Or, a rule could rely on
large post-breach penalties to persuade companies to use strong security—a
risky approach, since security risks are easy to underestimate and the costs
of a breach would be so high.
None of these three pillars is unique; all three represent elements of
existing privacy-protection schemes like the Fair Information Practices112 or
the European Union’s Data Protection Directive.113 The first pillar, substan-
tive limitations on data collection, use, and disclosure, reflects principles like
“respect for context” and “focused collection” enumerated in the Obama ad-
ministration’s proposed Consumer Bill of Rights. That proposal suggests
111. See F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015); see also
Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014) (arguing that in Wyndham, the “defendant’s arguments against the
FTC’s detailed security requirements neglect[ed] to acknowledge that FTC jurisprudence has
progressed in a natural and logical fashion. One would expect over time for a general standard
about data security to be refined as that standard is applied in specific cases. This is an almost
inevitable progression, and it is exactly how the common law works.”).
112. The FIPs, sometimes called the FIPPs (for Fair Information Practice Principles),
have a long and convoluted history in the law. The FIPs originated in the 1970s in the Depart-
ment of Health, Education & Welfare, and have since been articulated in various forms in
American law by the Federal Trade Commission; the National Science and Technology Coun-
cil; and the Departments of Homeland Security, Commerce, and Health and Human Services,
and internationally by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. For an
overview of this history, see generally Robert Gellman, Fair Information Practices: A Basic
History (June 17, 2016), http://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPShistory.pdf; Paul M.
Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 907–08 (2009); PRISCILLA M. REGAN,
LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 73–86 (1995).
113. Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC). [hereinafter Data Protection
Directive].
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that companies should limit their data collection, use, and disclosure so they
are consistent with the contexts in which consumers originally disclosed
data.114 Likewise, the Data Protection Directive imposes proportionality and
legitimate-purpose requirements that limit the purposes for which personal
information may be processed.115 The independent-gatekeeper model is rem-
iniscent of the EU’s data protection authorities, which have substantive au-
thority over the processing of personal information.116 And both the Data
Protection Directive and several implementations of the FIPs require custo-
dians to take steps to keep data secure.117
The approach we describe in this section is both narrower and broader
than the principles embraced in the FIPs and the Data Protection Directive,
since the context of black-box medicine presents specific privacy needs that
do not apply universally.118 The approach is narrower because unlike both
the FIPs and the Data Protection Directive, we do not focus on giving infor-
mation subjects rights to notice of, consent to, or control over the uses to
which information is put. Such individual rights are the most prominent
piece of most formulations of the FIPS and of privacy law in the United
States generally; they also represent an important piece of the EU’s data-
protection system.119 And they may be appropriate in the case of black-box
medicine, for reasons stemming from general privacy principles, or in cer-
tain contexts that arise in the development of black-box medicine. But a
114. WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAME-
WORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECON-
OMY 15, 21 (2012), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-
final.pdf. Not all formulations of the FIPs impose similar requirements. See infra notes 
115–119 and accompanying text.
115. Data Protection Directive, supra note 113, at arts. 6-7. See also Commission Regu-
lation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. arts. 4-6 (L 119) 1 [hereinafter General Data Protection Regulation]
(superseding the Data Protection Directive in 2018 with similar provisions).
116. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 113, at art. 28; General Data Protection 
Regulation, supra note 115, at arts. 51-59.
117. Data Protection Directive, supra note 113, at art. 17. See also FEDERAL TRADE COM-
MISSION, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 10 (1998), available at https://www. 
ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-report-congress/priv-23a.pdf 
(describing “integrity/security” as one of five widely accepted principles of privacy pro-
tection); WHITE HOUSE, supra note 114, at 19 (stating that consumers “have a right to secure 
and responsible handling of personal data”).
118. Compare, e.g., James G. Hodge, Jr., et al., Legal Issues Concerning Electronic 
Health Information: Privacy, Quality, and Liability, 282 J. AM. MED. ASSN. 1466 (1999).
119. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1880 (2013) (“[T]he basic approach to protecting privacy has re-
mained largely unchanged since the 1970s. . . . The law provides people with a set of rights to 
enable them to make decisions about how to manage their data. . . . I will refer to this approach 
to privacy regulation as ‘privacy self-management.’ ”); White House, supra note 114, at 11-15 
(asserting that consumers have rights “to exercise control over what personal data companies 
collect from them and how they use it” and “to easily understandable and accessible informa-
tion about privacy and security practices”); Data Protection Directive, supra note 113, at arts. 
9-12, 14-15.
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notice-and-consent regime would make it much harder to obtain the large
amounts of comprehensive health information needed for black-box
medicine to work. Since the potential social value of black-box medicine is
so large, tools like the substantive limitations described above would better
serve the twin goals of protecting patient privacy and encouraging the devel-
opment of high-quality black-box algorithms. And these tools are broader
because the substantive limitations on collection, use, and distribution of
health information and the duties of an independent gatekeeper are far more
detailed and limiting than the general principles enumerated in the FIPs and
the Data Protection Directive. Because the potential privacy harms from
misuse of health information are so great, safeguards not normally used in
other industries, like advance gatekeeper approval before a company en-
gages in any data collection, use, or distribution, are likely necessary.
Each of the three pillars discussed in this section is an important compo-
nent of any scheme to encourage verification of black-box medicine while
preserving patient privacy because each addresses a different threat model.
Substantive restrictions on data collection, use, and disclosure help ensure
that developers of black-box algorithms, who face strong incentives to disre-
gard patient privacy, are restrained from doing so. Independent gatekeepers
help ensure that patient data and black-box models are shared with research-
ers who can perform independent verification while removing conflicts of
interest and ensuring that that sharing avoids posing greater risks to patient
privacy. And information-security requirements help ensure that malicious
outsiders cannot get hold of patient information, preventing data breaches.
Without each component, key openings would remain for patient privacy to
be lost without any corresponding benefit.
C. Case Study: Data and the Clinical-Trial Debate
Experience with similar data-sharing problems in other health-care con-
texts shows the importance of the three pillars discussed in the last section.
Clinical-trial data sharing, for instance, provides a useful case study of how
privacy can be built into a system in which detailed medical information is
shared between companies, researchers, and the government.120 When re-
searchers carry out clinical trials to test new drugs or other medical interven-
tions, they collect large amounts of data about patients, including how those
patients respond to the new drug or intervention.121 Some of these data are
analyzed to determine the results of the study; some of those results are
120. See IOM, Sharing Clinical Trial Data, supra note 98 (explaining that the committee
“analyzes how several risks associated with sharing clinical trial data (in particular individual
participant data and CSRs) might be addressed through controls on data access (i.e., with
whom the data are shared and under what conditions) without compromising the usefulness of
data sharing for the generation of additional scientific knowledge”).
121. Id. at 18 (“Vast amounts of data are generated over the course of a clinical trial.”).
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published, though many are not.122 Whether or not a study is published, how-
ever, much of the data collected is never analyzed; and almost all of these
data are typically kept proprietary.123 Although such proprietary data are dis-
closed to the FDA when a study’s sponsor seeks regulatory approval for a
new drug or intervention, only study summaries and results are usually
available to others.
This paradigm of limited data sharing has been challenged in recent
years by researchers and other third parties seeking broader disclosure of
raw data from clinical trials.124 These third parties have different goals.
Some seek to use raw clinical-trial data to validate published results, com-
bining data from different trials into larger datasets and performing secon-
dary analyses.125 Others seek to speed drug discovery, find new drug targets,
or identify intermediate clinical goals that are easier to measure.126 All of
these goals, like the goals of black-box medicine, seek to find new patterns
in previously disparate sources of health information. And just as in black-
box medicine, clinical-trial data sharing faces interrelated problems of ac-
countability and privacy: Sharing clinical-trial data helps third parties vali-
date the results of clinical trials, while exposing health information in ways
that could lead to privacy harms.
In the wake of these increasing calls for clinical-trial data sharing, schol-
ars and policymakers have considered numerous regulatory questions, in-
cluding how to make data available for independent analysis and verification
without sacrificing patient privacy.127 The most prominent effort culminated
122. See Peter Doshi et al., Restoring Invisible and Abandoned Trials: A Call for People
to Publish the Findings, 346 BMJ f2865 (2013) (observing that one “basic proble[m] of repre-
sentation driving growing concerns about relying on published research to reflect truth . . . is
no representation (invisibility), which occurs when a trial remains unpublished years after
completion.”).
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Peter Doshi et al., Raw Data from Clinical Trials: Within Reach?, 34
TRENDS PHARMACOLOGICAL SCI. 645 (2013) (“Making raw data from clinical trials widely
publically available should reduce selective reporting biases and enhance the reproducibility of
and trust in clinical research . . . [though] the optimal procedures for data sharing are hotly
debated.”); Hamel et al., supra note 98 (“Data from clinical trials, including participant level
data, are being shared by sponsors and investigators more widely than ever before. . . . [It] may
bring exciting benefits for scientific research and public health but may also have unintended
consequences. Thus, expanded data sharing must be pursued thoughtfully.”).
125. IOM, Sharing Clinical Trial Data, supra note 98, at 18 (“Today, researchers other
than the trialists have limited access to clinical trial data that could be used to reproduce
published results, carry out secondary analyses, or combine data from different trials in sys-
tematic reviews. Public well-being would be enhanced by the additional knowledge that could
be gained from these analyses.”).
126. Id.
127. Other questions of clinical-trial data governance, including avoiding data misuse,
protecting intellectual property, preventing undue commercial harms to those sharing data, and
enhancing public trust, may also have relevance for black-box medicine but are beyond the
scope of this article. See id. at 139–58.
Fall 2016] Privacy and Accountability in Black-Box Medicine 41
in a report from the Institute of Medicine in 2015.128 The report called for
open access to the results of clinical trials, but more limited access to raw
data from those trials, reasoning that such a compromise would best balance
the legitimate interest in data sharing with the risks, burdens, and challenges
it would bring.
Critically, in making recommendations for ways to protect privacy, the
Institute of Medicine report included elements of each of the pillars dis-
cussed in the last section. On the first pillar (substantive restrictions on the
collection, use, and disclosure of data), it made relatively few recommenda-
tions, since the information collected in clinical trials is otherwise regulated
by the FDA. But it made several recommendations designed to minimize the
risk of data disclosures. It recommended deidentification, as is typical in
health research,129 while noting the dangers of reidentification and recom-
mending that recipients of data should commit not to intentionally reidentify
data subjects.130 And although clinical-trial data contains large amounts of
detailed patient health information, the report recommended against more
robust deidentification techniques that degrade data quality by, for instance,
removing details.131 Since these techniques would harm the utility of the
data, the report instead called for combining surface-level deidentification
methods with information-security measures—the third pillar discussed
above—to safeguard data against inadvertent and unauthorized access.132
The most detailed recommendations in the Institute of Medicine report
concerned procedural safeguards regulating access to clinical-trial data, in-
cluding an independent gatekeeper like the one discussed in the second pillar
above. The report recommended that access to clinical-trial data be moder-
ated by a gatekeeper, ideally an independent panel that could evaluate the
expertise and research objectives of entities seeking access.133 It also recom-
mended that that gatekeeper require those receiving data to commit to data-
use agreements prohibiting unapproved uses such as reidentification, contact
with clinical-trial participants, and further data sharing.134 And it recom-
mended that data access be transparent.135
Groups are working to implement the committee’s recommendations.
One prominent group acting as an independent gatekeeper is the Yale Open
Data Access (YODA) Project, which partners with pharmaceutical compa-
128. Id.
129. Id. at 144.
130. Id. at 145-46.
131. Id at 146.
132. Id. at 146–47.
133. Id. at 149–56.
134. Id. at 147–48. The committee noted other common data use agreement provision,
including assignments of intellectual property, prohibitions on competitive commercial use,
acknowledgement requirements in publications, and restrictions on non-proposed data uses. Id.
135. Id. at 156.
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nies to provide access to patient-level clinical-trial data.136 As of July 2016,
YODA has data from nearly 200 clinical trials, which it makes available to
researchers using it to further science and public-health goals.137 In addition
to serving as an independent gatekeeper, YODA imposes policies that pro-
mote the other pillars of privacy-preserving information sharing, include re-
quirements for transparency of access, data security, prior assessment of
researcher and research quality, and data-use Agreements limiting further
dissemination or commercial use of data.138
Projects like YODA show that the committee’s recommendations and
analyses provide helpful examples of how to implement a system of robust
data sharing while protecting patient privacy—exactly what is needed for
black-box medicine to thrive. Not all of its recommendations apply to black-
box medicine. In particular, some technological means of protecting data,
like distributed datasets and the introduction of random noise, would be
problematic for developers of black-box medicine, who rely on large unified
datasets (making distribution problematic) and often cannot predict what
data will be useful (making it hard to introduce random noise without harm-
ing the utility of the datasets). However, the report’s analysis reinforces the
roles that the three basic pillars of privacy-preserving accountability can
play in providing a useful framework for protecting privacy in black-box
medicine.
CONCLUSION
Black-box medicine could transform health care, but to do so it must
first overcome the twin challenges of algorithmic accountability and patient
privacy. These challenges stem from the big-data nature of black-box
medicine. Researchers need access to massive amounts of health information
to develop black-box algorithms, putting patients at risk of privacy losses.
And independent researchers need access to this same information to verify
black-box algorithms, ensuring they are accurate and unbiased, but risking
further privacy losses. Balancing this tension between accountability and
privacy is a key challenge in the development of black-box medicine.
To best accommodate these competing challenges, policymakers should
look to a framework of privacy-preserving accountability built on three pil-
lars. First, researchers developing black-box algorithms should comply with
substantive limitations on the collection, use, and disclosure of patient health
information. Second, independent gatekeepers should oversee information
sharing between those developing and verifying black-box algorithms. And
136. THE YODA PROJECT, http://yoda.yale.edu/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2016).
137. Id.; Policies & Procedures to Guide External Investigator Access to Clinical Trial
Data, THE YODA PROJECT, http://yoda.yale.edu/policies-procedures-guide-external-investigat 
or-access-clinical-trial-data (last visited Nov. 6, 2016).
138. Id.
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third, robust information-security requirements should be imposed to prevent
unintentional data breaches of patient information. By developing rules
based on these three pillars, regulators can help ensure that patients obtain
the substantial benefits of black-box medicine without sacrificing their
privacy.
